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Abstract
This thesis presents a survey o f Alain Badiou’s ontology and theory o f the “event,”
including his understanding o f “faithful subject,” followed by an examination o f Slavoj
Zizek’s materialist theology, undertaken with a view to what they can say to inform the
modem Western Church. Though the thrust o f their work is primarily political and
ethical in nature, Zizek and Badiou will be drawn upon here to construct an outline of a
“pointal ecclesiology,” by which is meant the collective fidelity o f the Spirit community
to a truth, point by point, in a world. While wholehearted appropriation of their work is
not theologically unproblematic, an engagement with their thought proves to be
enriching. The result is an understanding o f new possibilities for Christian political
participation, Church diversity, fidelity to truth, and the collective.

Keywords: Alain Badiou, Slavoj Zizek, event, fidelity, ecclesiology, Christianity, Church,
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Introduction

This thesis is based on a suspicion that the Church in the West, like Nietzsche’s God, is
dead, has been killed by what Feuerbach has called the “omnipotence of subjectivity,” by
its worship commodification, and its rabid striving for sensation and (false) novelty. In it,
the “faithful subject” has been reduced to a “life-style participant,” a feeling addict
(justified no doubt by an incamational theology which does little more than make an idol
out o f human sensuality), or a subject characterized by a merely “Pascalian” fidelity
which thinks that because one goes through the proper motions, makes the proper
gestures, one must really believe .1 It was the rather eccentric Alan Watts who already

1 “Vous voulez aller a la foi, et vous n'en savez pas le chemin; vous voulez vous guérir de
l'infidélité, et vous en demandez les remèdes. Apprenez (les) de ceux qui ont été tels
comme vous, et qui parient maintenant tout leur bien. Ce sont gens qui savent un chemin
que vous voudriez suivre, et guéris d'un mal dont vous voulez guérir. Suivez la manière
par où ils ont commencé: c'est en faisant tout comme s'ils croyoient, en prenant de l'eau
bénite, en faisant dire des messes, etc. Naturellement même cela vous fera croire et vous
abêtira.” Pascal, Pensées, 233. Or as they say in Alcoholics Anonymous, “Fake it till you
make it.”

[You want to have faith and you do not know how; you want to heal yourself o f unbelief
and you ask for the remedy. Learn from those who have been like you, and who are now
betting all their possessions. These are people who know a way which you would like to
follow, and who are healed of an evil that you want cured. Follow the way by which they
have set out: that is by doing all as if they believed, by taking the holy water, by saying
masses, etc. Even this will, naturally, make you believe and deaden your passion.*] (*
Others have translated this “deaden your acuteness,” or “make you more docile,” the idea
being that by simply going through with the motions one’s critical faculty will slowly be
overcome. (See for example Blaise Pascal, Pensées (London: Penguin Books, 2003),
125). This is certainly acceptable considering Pascal’s argument here. It does not, in my
opinion however, make the proper reference to Pascal’s earlier statement: “Travaillez
donc à vous convaincre, non pas par l'augmentation des preuves de Dieu, mais par la
diminution de vos passions” [Work then, to convince yourself, not by the increase of the
proofs o f God, but by the decrease o f your passions].
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suspected the truth: they don’t believe, they only believe that they should believe, and this
with fundamentalist zeal. From this my basic question is thus: What can be done to
reinvigorate the Church in the West?
To narrow this enormous field somewhat, this thesis explores the possibility o f a
marriage between the work o f two contemporary atheist philosophers, Alain Badiou and
Slavoj Zizek, and Christian thought (concerning which both have written fairly
extensively), specifically towards the development o f what I’ve called here a “pointal
ecclesiology.” In one sense this is a simple task. It involves an appropriation of both
philosophical thought (Badiou) and a materialist theology (Zizek). How is it possible to
find correspondence between the thought o f two militant atheists and Christian faith
without horrific distortion of one or the other? Here a polarization between the two is
rejected .2 This is partly due to Zizek’s position in which modem materialism is viewed as
a necessary manifestation o f a certain kind o f kenotic theology. The gap is bridged by a
suicidal God who leaves the heavens empty, leaving humans with a profound
responsibility for the future on their shoulders. In addition, there is little doubt that both
theology and atheism are interested in notions o f the true, of what’s real, what knowledge

Alan E. Lewis addresses this from the perspective o f Easter Saturday: “Not only then is
Easter Saturday the day o f mutual contradiction between those who believe in God and
those who cannot; it is also the day o f shared contradiction for those who believe in the
absolute God and those who cannot, by the theology o f the Crucified One: faith in the life
and power o f the God who is dead. To the extent that both these conflicts are occurring
now, with great intensity, at the end o f the modem era, means that today is a cultural
“Easter Saturday.” And that is the context, where faith hears and opposes both partners in
the disputation between theism and atheism, in which theology must work today, and to
which the gospel must be addressed.” Alan E. Lewis, Between Cross & Resurrection: A
Theology o f Holy Saturday (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2001), 236.
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or teaching can be trusted etc. In this sense they are united, though their methodological
approaches often diverge, sometimes a great deal as in mystical approaches, sometimes
very little as in those cases so prominent in Western Christianity which engage in what
Creston Davis has referred to as “secular reasoning.” In these instances Christian
apology takes on (at least superficially) the method o f scientific-rational discourse. In
addition, there is also the long history of philosophical theology in which thought about
Christian truth is conditioned by non-Christian philosophies.
Thus the dialogue which this thesis seeks to foster has long and deep precedent in
the Christian tradition. The supposed “distortion” o f faith which results from such an
approach to theology, on some accounts, is in my judgment mostly an error o f the
uninformed who long for a pristine tradition, revelation and doctrine, unencumbered by
temporal-historical considerations. Yet, there is admittedly a sense in which one might
“go too far,” when complementarity spills over into the outright rejection o f that which it
seeks to compliment or inform. The focus o f this thesis, however, is not on making this
determination, as much as I recognize the importance o f the issue. The thesis seeks,
rather, to discover in what ways two particular scholars might inform the Church. Among
the categories elaborated on in the thesis, and which have been drawn from Badiou and
Zizek, the following might be mentioned at the outset: experimentation, creative novelty,
truth, Christian subjectivity, Spirit, communitas, and related to all these, an optimistic
political engagement. They are indeed all interrelated, as any theologian could easily
recognize even without exact definitions, though the terminology may differ in some3

3 Slavoj Zizek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity o f Christ: Paradox or Dialectic
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 8 .
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respects. For example, “experimentation” is rarely used in theological discourse, though
in constructing a pointal ecclesiology this term will be quite important. During the course
o f Christianity, however, “experimentation” by another name and somewhat distorted
character has been rampant, leading to multiform Christian groups and thought, even
though this term may never have been applied to it. It is the positive designation o f the
more negative term usually used, i.e. “disunity.” It is one o f the wagers of a pointal
ecclesiology that experimentation will form a vital way forward for the Church, an
experimentation that is not simply reactionary, but intentional. This is but one small
piece o f the whole o f this thesis, and only the very first small steps towards thinking a
pointal ecclesiology based on the work o f Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek. In the end, as
with all o f our efforts, my sentiments mirror those o f Saint Paul who once said:
[F]ire will test the quality o f each person’s work. If what has been built survives,
the builder will receive a reward. If it is burned up, the builder will suffer loss but
yet will be saved— even though only as one escaping through the flames.4
But do these words not also mirror a certain reading o f theology in which the divine Other
risks it all on the work o f its own hands, even to the point o f being “burned up?” Though
I have not touched on it, “risk” certainly accompanies those categories I elaborate on
here, and should not be understood apart from what Zizek has called a “monstrosity,”
which is also what I recognize as the Christian Idea.
V

In what follows, I propose to outline the work o f Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek
insofar as it relates to the ecclesiological project this work might inform. In Chapter One,
we will briefly explore Alain Badiou’s ontology as a basis for a later exploration o f his

4 1 Corinthians 3:13-15 (New International Version).
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understanding o f the “Subject.” Following this will be an examination o f Badiou’s notion
o f “Change” and “Point,” leading into a brief look at Badiou’s political praxis. In
Chapter Two our attention will turn to Slavoj Zizek and his understanding o f the “Death
o f God.” This in turn will inspire the second part o f that Chapter, an outline o f Zizek’s
notion o f the “Spirit” and “Collective.” Chapter Three will present more o f a critical
engagement with their work, and give a preliminary sketch o f what I’m calling a “pointal
ecclesiology,” based on my reading o f Badiou and Zizek. It will be argued that although
Badiou presents the Church with some valuable ideas, his work needs to be supplemented
with Zizek’s in order to bridge the gap between the former’s radical atheism and Christian
faith. This will lead to a “pointal ethic,” a way o f “doing” Church that draws on the
categories hinted at above, which will also be explicated further in the final Chapter.

6

Chapter One
Alain Badiou: A Subject of Truth and its Consequences

1.1 Foundations of the Subject
Though it has fallen on hard times in recent decades, this thesis will argue that
there are still immensely valuable philosophical resources that theology can draw from
the political Left, which, like the Church, continually hears the call to remake itself within
the flux o f history and culture. O f particular interest for our purposes are two Leftist
philosophers, the first o f whom, Alain Badiou, lays the groundwork for the second, Slavoj
Zizek.
Leaving aside the second for the present, we can begin at the beginning by turning
to the first, mathematician and French philosopher Alain Badiou. Badiou has developed a
theory o f the Event, a philosophical explication o f an evental ontology which is crucial
for understanding one’s fidelity to a cause, which as a fidelity is primarily ethical in
nature. He has further elaborated a logic o f appearing, worked out in the context o f the
formalized framework o f the body. Critical here is the notion o f a collective. To
understand what these Communists mean by Communism, one must understand what
Badiou means by fidelity to an Event. Before this, however, one must first understand
how Badiou structures an Event, how he structures being itself.

7

Underlying Badiou’s ontology is a Parmenidean premise, as Badiou himself sums
up: “what presents itself is essentially multiple; what presents itself is essentially one .”5
To understand this point, another ancient authority may be called on: Titus Lucretius
Cams (c. 99-55 BCE). In his De Rerum Natura67*Lucretius expounds the Epicurean
philosophy o f atomic theory. All being is made up o f atoms, that is to say, all that there
is, is made up o f atoms (1.483-634). Some atoms form compound structures which may
be detected with the human senses (2.891-895). To use the language o f Plato’s
Parmenides, being has become “visible” in these instances, made up of an infinite
number o f smaller parts. For Badiou too, being is a “multiple multiplicity.” These
multiplicities do not exist as such, but they have being. Being is pure multiplicity. How is
this so? It is so in a similar way that the referent o f a mathematical formula does not exist
as such, and yet, has being. “For a multiple to be, is to belong to another multiple, whose
being is already presupposed .”9 This referential multiple is known as a “situation”:
multiples which present themselves .10 “Situations” designate things that are: “regardless

5 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2007), 23.

6 Lucretius, On the Nature o f Things, trans. Martin Ferguson Smith (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2001). All subsequent references are to the text of Lucretius.
7 Plato, Parmenides, in The Collected Dialogues o f Plato Including the Letters, Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963). This
dialogue makes no specific reference to “atoms” or “particles” but there can be found
here the making o f a similar theory in Parmenides argument that being is infinite in
multiplicity: “Thus being is parceled out among beings o f every possible order from
smallest to greatest; it is subdivided to the furthest possible point and has an illimitable
number o f parts. So its parts form the greatest o f multitudes” (144b-144c).
n

Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought (London: Continuum, 2009), 7.
9 Alain Badiou, “Existence and Death,” Discourse (Winter 2002), 67.
10 Badiou, Being and Event, 24.

$

o f its modality; that is, regardless o f whether it is necessary, contingent, possible, actual,
potential, or virtual - a whim, a supermarket, a work o f art, a dream... or a set of
waves .”11123
Badiou’s first difficulty with the idea o f being as presented multiplicity is very
much the same difficulty encountered by Parmenides. One may speak o f all being as
“one,” but if we posit the being o f being outside o f the realm o f appearance, outside o f
being’s presentation, how could we possibly have knowledge o f it? As Plato puts it:
Parmenides: Suppose someone should say that the forms, if they are such as we
are saying they must be, cannot even be known. One could not convince him that
he was mistaken in that objection, unless he chanced to be a man o f wide
experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long and
remote train o f argument. Otherwise there would be no way o f convincing a man
who maintained that the forms were unknowable.
Socrates: Why so, Parmenides?
Parmenides: Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that
each o f them has a real being 'just by itself,' would admit, to begin with, that no
1o
such real being exists in our world.
Badiou, however, breaks with any notion o f a Form outside o f presented being: “We find
ourselves on the brink o f a decision, a decision to break with the arcane o f the one and the
multiple in which philosophy is bom and buried... This decision can take no other form
•

i o

than the following: the one is not.”

11 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 7.
12 Parmenides, (133b-133c).
13

Badiou, Being and Event, 23.
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In his sequel to Being and Event, Logics o f Worlds, Badiou further elaborates on
this point. When one speaks o f the “Whole” (the One/Universe, itself a multiplicity), he
argues, one must include within the conception the count o f the multiplicity o f elements
that make it up, otherwise it cannot be the Whole. Badiou refers to these types of
multiplicities (those which present themselves in their multiplicity) as reflexive.14 There
exist multiplicities which are not reflexive. The other customers in the coffee shop before
me present a multiple, but the set o f these customers is not a customer itself. Badiou
accordingly divides the Whole into two parts, the reflexive and the non-reflexive. Next
Badiou asks about the set o f all the non-reflexive multiples. He names this set the
Chimera. Suppose the Chimera is reflexive. If so it must present itself within the
composition o f its own set. Immediately we have a problem because the Chimera is the
set o f non-reflexive multiples. The Chimera cannot be reflexive. If the Chimera is non
reflexive it must present itself along with the other non-reflexive multiples. We have
already said, however, that the Chimera is the set o f all non-reflexive multiples. It must
therefore be presented among these multiples and consequently reflexive. Badiou
concludes that “the Chimera is not .”14
15 Consequently, the Whole, having lent its being to
the Chimera is also not.
In Being and Event, Badiou quickly follows this argument up with a supplemental
one in that he makes it clear that by no means is the symbolic function of the one, of

14 Alain Badiou, Logics o f Worlds: Being and Event II (London: Continuum, 2009), 109.
These are far fewer in number than the non-reflexive multiples below. In fact, Badiou
only concentrates on one: the Whole, or Universe. While he does comment on the
Chimera (below), this will serve to prove the inconsistency o f the One.
15 Ibid., 110.
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Oneness lost in all o f this. This is important for Badiou’s use o f set theory in developing
his ontology. “Oneness,” for Badiou, is only ever a “count-for-one,” a mathematical
conception which functions as operation.16178 In set theory various elements (multiplicities)
may be grouped together to form sets and subsets o f sets and so on (they too being
multiplicities). The count-for-one o f a multiplicity is its presented structure, as Badiou
says, “it is what prescribes, for a presented multiple, the regime o f its count-for-one.”

17

For now, however, it is precisely the notion o f an “event” which must be explored.
Having laid the groundwork with Badiou’s ontology, the next step is to grasp what he
means by “event” and what role the “universal” plays in this discussion.
For Badiou (and ultimately for Zizek), Communism contains within itself a
i o

universal Idea (the emancipation o f humanity from oppression and inequality).

For

him, philosophy, or rather a philosopher,1920is always committed to a situation in the name
o f universal principles. What this universality consists of has been helpfully summed up
in eight theses, articulated by Badiou during a 2004 discussion with Zizek in Vienna:
Thesis 1: Thought is the proper medium o f the universal
Thesis 2: Every universal is singular, or is a singularity
Thesis 3: Every universal originates in an event, and the event is intransitive to the
particularity o f the situation
Thesis 4: A universal initially presents itself as a decision about an undecidable
16 Ibid., 24.
17 Ibid.
18 See for example Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis (London: Verso, 2010);
Slavoj Zizek, In Defense o f Lost Causes (London: Verso, 2008).
191 see no reason to limit this commitment to philosophers as we shall see.
20 Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, Philosophy in the Present (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2009).
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Thesis
Thesis
Thesis
Thesis

5: The universal has an implicative form
6 : The universal is univocal
7: Every universal singularity remains incomplete or open
8 : Universality is nothing other than the faithful construction o f an infinite

generic
multiple
A brief explanation is in order: To say that thought is the medium o f the universal is to
say that no object or “objective regularity” can take the form o f the universal (thesis 1). It
is entirely subjective: the process o f a subject-thought at the local level.

This includes,

for Badiou, the process o f repeating the proof o f a universal proposition. He uses the
example, “the series o f prime numbers is infinite.”

Here universality lies in the way the

statement demands us to provide (in thought) a proof for it, both at the local level (the
subjective act o f proving the proposition) and as part o f a global procedure (the
mobilization o f mathematics). Thus universality presents itself as singular, or a
singularity (thesis 2). That is to say, “every universal presents itself not as a
regularization o f the particular or o f differences, but as a singularity that is subtracted
from identitarian predicates; although it obviously proceeds via those predicates.”

This

is largely why Badiou is opposed to the liberal construction o f a “tolerant society” based
merely on universal respect for particular cultural identities. In his view this universality21*3

21 “If there is no ethics ‘in general’, that is because there is no abstract Subject, who
would adopt it as his shield. There is only a particular kind o f animal, convoked by
certain circumstances to become a subject - or rather, to enter into the composing o f a
subject.” Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding o f Evil (London: Verso,
2002), 40. This will initially present itself as problematic for the explication of a
theology o f the event as Badiou does not allow for a transcendental Subject in this
formulation. This will be challenged by Zizek in his materialist construction of theology.

Badiou and Zizek, Philosophy in the Present, 28.
23

Ibid., 30-31.
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breaks down as soon as one encounters a particularity that is intolerant towards the others,
or resists any integration into this universalizing procedure:
The truth is that in order to maintain that respect for particularity is a universal
value, it is necessary to have first distinguished between good particularities and
bad ones. In other words, it is necessary to have established a hierarchy in the list
o f descriptive predicates. It will be claimed, for example, that a cultural or
religious particularity is bad if it does not include within itself respect for other
particularities. But this is obviously to stipulate that the formal universal already
be included in the particularity. Ultimately, the universality of respect for
particularities is only the universality o f universality. This definition is fatally
tautological .24*
This is why Badiou considers all universals as subtracted from identitarian predicates. Of
course within a situation the “universal proceeds via these predicates,” but this is
unexpected and without previous conception within the framework of particular
predication. For this reason Badiou conceives o f the universal, not within the order of
being, but o f the “supernumerary.”

It follows from this that every universal locates

itself within an event, and this event is intransitive to any particularity o f a situation
(thesis 3). That is to say, in being caught up in the universal, the event supplements a
presented situation.

Ibid., 30. Or as Zizek astutely states: “We thus encounter the paradox o f tolerance at its
purest: how far should tolerance for intolerance go? All the Politically Correct beautiful
liberal formulas on how caricatures [of the Prophet Mohammed in Danish newspapers]
were insulting and insensitive, but violent reactions to them are also unacceptable, about
how freedom also brings responsibility and should not be abused, etc., show their
limitation here. What is this famous “freedom with responsibility” if not a new version of
the good old paradox of forced choice: you are given a freedom of choice - on condition
that you make the right choice; you are given freedom - on condition that you will not
really use it.” Slavoj Zizek, “Antinomies o f Tolerant Reason,” Lacanian Ink, available
from http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm (10 March 2010).
25 Badiou, Being and Event, 178. “The event is not actually internal to the analytic of the
multiple. Even though it can always be localized within presentation, it is not, as such,
presented, nor is it presentable. It is -not being- supernumerary.”
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To understand what Badiou means by “event” one needs only to think of the
“French Revolution or Paris Commune ,”2627whose themes o f emancipation simultaneously
inscribe them within the realm o f the universal while cutting across the particularity o f
their situations. It is fidelity to the event that constitutes the human subject: “That is to
say that at a given moment, everything he is - his body, his abilities - is called upon to
enable the passing o f a truth along its path. This is when the human animal is convoked
[,requis] to be the immortal that he was not yet.”

This fidelity is composed o f a

decision. The event itself is a decision about a previously indiscernible area o f
knowledge internal to a situation (thesis 4 ).28

Badiou is fond o f appealing to the example o f the occupation at the church o f St.
Bernard de la Chapelle in 1996. A previously undecidable of a situation (what is the
status o f the Sans Papiers: are they citizens o f France or not) was publically declared by

26 Badiou and Zizek, Philosophy in the Present, 31. I see no reason not to include the
American Revolution here, at least some o f whose agents after all, must certainly have
understood themselves as participating within the field o f fidelity to libertas (though see
John Phillip Reid, The Concept o f Liberty in the Age o f the American Revolution
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1988): “It was a term on everyone’s lips, flowing
from everyone’s pen, and appealed to by supporters o f every political persuasion... both
parties to the revolutionary controversy could use the word “liberty” in the same yet
opposite ways - one invoking American liberty, the other British liberty - to support
opposing causes” (11). But can one not detect here the universality of an idea precisely
because o f its ability to be adapted to diverse and even opposing political causes?
27 Badiou, Ethics, 40.
28 In his / ’Organisationpolitique Badiou puts it this way: “Il s’agit en effet de découvrir
dans la situation des possibilités inconnues, et d’en faire le mot d’ordre politique du
moment. Et ce travail (découverte d ’une possibilité, mise en forme de son contenu, action
réfléchie pour sa réalisation) est le travail de tous ceux qui participent au processus, de
tous ceux qui désirent se mêler de la situation.” L'Organisation Politique. Online, Forum
Marxiste-Léniniste, available from http://humaniterouge.alloforum.com/organisationpolitique-t2605-l.html (3 July 2010).
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intellectuals, labour union leaders, human rights organizations, the Communist party, and
the Sans Papiers themselves, to be decidable in that the Sans Papiers should be
considered citizens o f France and encouraged people to cease referring to them as
'S Q

“clandestins ” (the slang form: clandos), or “illegal immigrants”.

In addition to this

primary evental decision (which is properly speaking a fidelity to the trace of the evental
statement or naming- see below), there is the further decision to relate to a situation from
“the perspective o f its evental [événementiel] supplement.”

In other words, one must

decide how to live within the new situation o f the evental supplement. Badiou also uses
the example o f Einstein’s physics: “After Einstein’s texts o f 1905, if I am faithful to their
radical novelty, I cannot continue to practise physics within its classical framework. An
evental fidelity is a real break (both thought and practised) in the specific order within
which the event took place .”29
31
30

It follows then that every fidelity follows an evental statement. In the case above,
the evental statement was effectively “Sans Papiers are citizens of France” (as opposed to
non-subjects worthy o f deportation). Fidelity to this break with the previous situation will
manifest itself in both thought and practice (“there no longer exists for me the term
clandestin, only citizens o f France who I will treat as such,” etc.). This is why Badiou’s
fifth thesis is that the universal has an implicative form. That the universal is univocal is
merely to say that it is the act which decides the evental statement, giving it valence, and

29 See Craig R. Whitney, “Police in Paris Smash Immigrants' Sit-In,” The New York
Times (24 August 1996).
30 Badiou Ethics, 41.
31 Ibid., 42.
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that this act is “subtracted from all interpretation” as act (thesis 6).

From this act,

initially local in nature, fidelity is made possible on a broader scope, with various
implicate forms arising as the consequences o f the act are worked out (thesis 7). The
result is an infinite generic multiple, a subset o f the initial situation which could not be
known in advance (thesis 8). It is not determined by particular predicates, but cuts across
them as in the case o f “political gatherings, whose universality follows from their
indifference to social, national, sexual or generational origin...”

I have previously noted that an appropriation o f Badiou’s ontological thesis for an
ecclesiology will run into a number o f difficulties (note 21). Badiou makes it clear in,
Saint Paul: The Foundation ofUniversalism, that Paul should be considered nothing
more than a “theoretician” o f universality, that it is because Paul is a theorist of the order
o f a fable (Christ’s resurrection), that Paul’s “truth” is an event which “repudiates its
pretension to real truth .”*334 This is primarily because any contemporary notion o f God
lacks valence: “knowledge enjoins us not to decide about God: it is quite acceptable to
maintain that perhaps ‘something’ exists, or perhaps it does not .”35 Frederick Depoortere
has argued that an “all-too-quick theological appropriation o f Badiou” should be avoided,
on the basis that: 1) there is no room in Badiou’s ontology for a religious truth; 2) there is
no room in Badiou’s conception o f an event for the transcendent, and 3) Badiou rejects

Badiou and Zizek, Philosophy in the Present,A3.
33 Ibid., 47.
34 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation ofUniversalism (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 108.
v

Badiou and Zizek, Philosophy in the Present, 35.

contemporary hermeneutics as overly “conservative and reactionary.”
makes the point, following Kenneth Reynhout,

Depoortere

that there are five ways a theologian can

respond to Badiou, which he groups into two extreme responses and three moderate
ones .36
3738*One can either: 1) completely ignore Badiou; 2) completely endorse his atheistic
ontology; or more moderately 3) criticize his ontology; 4) accept his ontology but reject
his atheism; or 5) accept Badiou’s ontology completely, but nuance Badiou’s atheist
conclusion. In his Badiou and Theology, Depoortere gives an example of the fifth
strategy but mainly opts for the fourth, drawing on Aristotle and Aquinas, as well as
Cantor (the creator o f set theory) to claim that the possibility o f an absolute infinite
implies the actual existence o f one, i.e. God.

As commentators have rightly pointed out,

Depoortere largely fails in his efforts .40 What this thesis proposes is a sixth response to

36 Frederick Depoortere, “Alain Badiou and God” (paper presented at seminar for
Theology & Ethics, University o f Edinburgh, March 11, 2010) available online at
http://kuleuven.academia.edu/documents/0078/2395/Edinburgh.pdf.
37 Kenneth Reynhout, “Alain Badiou: Hidden Theologian o f the Void?” The Heythrop
Journal (2010 forthcoming). Available online at DOI: 10.111 l/j.14682265.2008.00415.x.
38 Depoortere (2010).

Frederiek Depoortere, Badiou and Theology (London: Continuum, 2009). Creston
Davis calls this work, “...theology's first careful and sustained engagement with Badiou's
work by one o f the brightest young and capable theologians in our time...” Badiou and
Theology. Online, Continuum Books available from
http://www.continuumbooks.com/books/detail.aspx7BookRN 131542 (12 August 2010).
40 Clayton Crockett, “Badiou and Theology,” Notredame Philosophical Reviews (3 June
2010), available online http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=19847. “Depoortere is forced
to equivocate in terms o f this possibility o f an absolute infinite, because he needs the
absolute infinite to be possible in order to counter Badiou's atheism, but he needs to
overcome the limit o f this possibility in order to achieve his purpose, which is to prove
the actual existence o f God, which is the only way to avoid the closed circle o f faith.”
Depoortere obviously was not aware o f Badiou’s comments here: “This is certainly exact:
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Badiou :41 that we should accept his ontology but supplement his atheism with a
materialist theology, that is, a Christian atheism.

1.2 Subject
Having briefly explored Badiou’s ontology, we must now examine his logic of
appearing. Just as his ontology is the basis o f his logic of appearing, so too his logic of
appearing will be the basis o f the construction o f an ecclesiology, which here will involve
the thinking through of a faithful collective using Christian symbol and Badiouan
paradigms.
The starting point o f this examination must be the Subject. The Subject, as we
shall see, will be thought primarily in terms o f the body (which presupposes appearance),
and the event (which presupposes a truth). But as Badiou points out, the starting point of
any theory o f the Subject must not be a theory o f the object.42 Nonetheless, in the world,
the subject’s form will be unfolded from the two following points of thought:43
1) The evental trace: £
Cantor has shown that the infinite exists. However, it is by no means required that this
infinite be a God. Rather, it is Tike a Number.” Badiou, Ethics, 67.
41 It may be argued that this sixth response is already covered by Depoortere’s fifth. It is
true that my response results in a nuancing o f Badiou’s atheistic conclusions, but not in
the way Depoortere intends (see especially Depoortere (2009), Chapter 3).
42 Badiou, Logics o f Worlds, 49. Was this not the lesson o f Descartes, who after
questioning every body, extension, and place as illusion, was simultaneously able to posit
an ego from a cogitol
43

Ibid.
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2) A body issued from the event (in the form o f fidelity to it): C

Faithful Subject
Recent events in Egypt provide the opportunity to elucidate the example o f a
Badiouan political subject. The evental trace, to be named in the statement by Egyptian
youth: “Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity ,”44 comparable to revolutionary slogans the
world over, indicates the activation o f an evental subjectivity, a subjectivity in which
identitarian predicates do not play a role: “I don’t belong to any particular political party,
I’m one o f the people .”45 At every point the new subjectivated body must choose to be
faithful to the evental trace or to betray it, to defy curfews which deny it both freedom
and dignity, or submit to the wishes o f the errant superpower. These points always arise
in the present, must always be decided in the present.
As such the formulation o f the subject may be written thus:
G

c* *
Here, G is the evental trace (“Bread, Freedom, Human Dignity”), —the sign o f the
subordination o f C (the demonstrator’s faithful living out o f the implications o f G), C the
subjectivated body (the demonstrators, here homogenous), => the consequences o f C’s

44 Egypt: The youth perspective. Online, A lJazeera, http://english.aljazeera.net/
programmes/insidestory/2011/01/2011129111336830896.html 15:20 accessed February
10, 2011. This was also used as a slogan in the Tunisian revolutionary movement.
45 Ibid 2:14 “The same thing occurred in Tunisia, there was no particular party or leader
pushing these demonstrations.” 11:23-l 1:30.
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fidelity to the G (continued demonstrations, organization, defiance o f tyranny), and n the
Present (the Time in which a subjective fidelity to a truth is activated).
Badiou points out here that the Subject is not properly constituted by one of these
elements, but by the equation as a whole .46 He further adds another dimension to the
element C in that he recognizes the ever present inward diversity o f a body. He represents
this diversity by barring the C: 0. Strictly speaking there is no pristine body. For
example, consider the Christian Church. It has traditionally been composed o f the
priesthood, with its various functions and duties, in distinction from the laypeople who
also make up the body, and yet who ultimately live in fidelity to the same event :47
G

- => 71

0

A few additional comments should be made here. First, it should be noted that for
Badiou a subject is always defined in relation to a truth. We shall see that there are
differing kinds o f subjects, defined by their relation (fidelity/infidelity) to a truth.
Second, the subject is primarily understood in relation to a body and should therefore not
be understood in terms o f radical individuality, but rather in terms o f a communitas.
Third, and finally, a subject is always defined in the present, and is therefore not
constituted by nostalgic remembrance, but present subjectivity. The body does not mimic

46 Badiou, Logics o f Worlds, 53.
47 This is oversimplifying the point for the sake o f elucidation. Badiou does not see the
resurrection o f Christ as evental per se. He does, however, believe that St. Paul is the
faithful subject o f a truth in the form o f formulating a radical egalitarian community. See
Badiou, Saint Paul, 4-5.
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the form o f a historical fidelity, but creates itself by being faithful in the present, in the
present circumstances. In this sense it is always being made new.
As indicated above, there are multiple forms o f subjects. This is due to the forms
the relation to the evental trace may take. Badiou highlights three o f these subjects, one
o f which (the faithful Political Subject) we have already examined. In addition to the
faithful subject there is also the reactionary subject and the obscure subject.

Reactionary Subject
The reactionary subject is known by the dismissal o f the evental trace as event.
Badiou formulates this subject in its simple form thus:
—i6 => ft
Here, -i is the negation o f G, the consequence o f which =>, the Present of the faithful
AO

subject is extinguished ft.
To turn once more to our present Egyptian example: The reactive subject declares
that the “demonstrators” will eventually “drift away” (-16 ).4
49 They do not represent the
8
will o f the people: “For all the west, starting with the United States, [Mubarak] has
always been considered a wisest man and a point o f reference. Compared to a population

48 Badiou Logics o f Worlds, 55.
49 See Egypt in crisis: the revolutionary parallels with Iran, China and Romania. Online,
The Telegraph, available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/egypt/8305719/Egypt-in-crisis-the-revolutionary-parallels-withIran-China-and-Romania.html, accessed February 10, 2011.

o f 80 million, the number o f people on the streets is really low .”50 It further denies the
ability o f the activated body to carry out the consequences o f its statements without a
compromise o f its original position, or further undermines its role in the unfolding o f the
process (si).5152 For example, Hilary Clinton’s statement:

our assessment is that the

Egyptian Government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs
and interests o f the Egyptian people.”

It should be clear that no formalization of the

reactionary subject can be complete without reference to the faithful subject. The initial
formulation is talus qualis incomplete, thus:
-t€
6

=>

The reactionary subject cannot be constituted without reference to the faithful.

Obscure Subject

50 A quote from Silvio Berlusconi. Egypt needs reform not repression, say EU leaders.
Online, The Guardian, available from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/egypt-reform-eu-leaders-summit, accessed
February 10, 2011.
51 “There have also been signs of compromise in the opposition movement, with leaders
backing off their refusal to talk to the government until Mubarak, 82, and the old guard
leave.” Egypt opposition says talks to end crisis not enough. Online, Reuters Canada,
available from
http://ca.reuters.eom/article/topNews/idCATRE7003UW20110206?pageNumber=2&virt
ualBrandChannel=0, accessed February 15,2011.
52 Remarks With Spanish Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez. Online, U.S. Department o f
State, available from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/155280.htm, accessed
February 10, 2011.
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The obscure subject wills the destruction o f the politically subjectivated body.
CO

Badiou’s formulation follows:
C =» (-iG=> -i(£)
n
The obscure subject must negate the legitimacy o f fidelity to the evental trace through the
hoisting o f an immaculate configuration o f the body (C), by the “invocation o f a full and
pure transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race).”*54 Our
final example from Egypt: The baltagea, pro-Mubarak “thugs,” activate a fascist political
component with the use o f “clubs, machetes, swords and straight razors... to try to crush
Egypt’s democracy movement.”55 Evidence o f this obscure subjectivity can also be
found in its naming of an “atemporal fetish ,”56*58in this case the designation “War Hero” (C
).

Mubarak himself precisely designates the obscurantist’s formulation of “the
CD

incorruptible and indivisible over-body”

in a televised address during the protests: “The

nation remains. Visitors come and go but ancient Egypt will remain eternal, its banner
and safekeeping will pass from one generation to the next. It is up to us to ensure this in

Badiou Logics o f Worlds, 60.
54 Ibid., 59-60.
55 Watching Thugs With Razors and Clubs at Tahrir Sq. Online, The New York Times,
available from http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/02/03/opinion/03kristof.html?src=twrhp
accessed February 9,2011.
56 Badiou Logics o f Worlds, 60.

Hundreds injured after pro- and anti-government supporters clash in Egypt. Online, The
Toronto Star, available from http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/931940--promubarak-supporters-take-to-the-streets-of-egypt, accessed February 14, 2011.
58 Badiou Logics o f Worlds, 60.
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pride and dignity” (C ).59 Here the present (n ) is denigrated, placed under the bar (—) by
that very hoisting o f the atemporal fetish, a relation of the present’s servility to the
phantasmatic over-body.
We will next need to examine Badiou’s conception o f “change,” “points,” and
“bodies.” These have been touched on already to varying degrees. Briefly, for example,
the question o f change has been raised by the present (n ) o f the faithful subject. What is
this 7r in relation to that which came before it? Points, as I have already indicated
(Faithful Subject), are moments o f decision (and their implications) regarding fidelity,
compromise, or complete betrayal. Finally, we have seen that bodies are those bearers of
formal subjectivities.

1.3 Change, Point, and the Political

In order to treat the notion o f “change” one must also treat the Badiouan concept
o f “point” at the same time. We are not primarily concerned here with Badiou’s
explanation o f how anything appears at all out o f the pure multiplicity o f being ,60 but
how, once there is an appearing, there can be change within the order o f this appearing.
That objects appear in a world is fundamental. For Badiou, objects can have varying

59 Full text o f Mubarak’s speech. Online, Ya Libnan, available from
http://www.yalibnan.com/ 2011/02/02/full-text-of-mubaraks-speech/, accessed February

10, 2011.
60 Badiou’s treatment o f this may be found in Logics o f Worlds, 357.
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degrees o f intensity o f appearing. This will be for him the beginning o f the elucidation o f
the event in the field o f appearance. Every event must have its proper site o f appearing,
its unfolding in the phenomenal. This is a key point to keep in mind as we later work out
an evental or pointal ecclesiology. It means that the site o f the Eternal will always be the
Temporal. For Badiou there is never an exception to this rule, and for us too, it will be
argued, the paradox o f the God/man (etemal/temporal) Jesus is itself an evental
manifestation in the order o f appearing .616
2
Within the order o f appearance a “site” is an object which manifests itself which
counts itself in its own field o f appearing.

For example, the object “month o f December

2010” in the world “Tunisia” is one o f a multiplicity o f objects (elements) within the field
“year.” What makes “December 2010” a site is its radical break within the order of this
world, a simultaneous break and signification o f the new. This new we will call
(negatively) “Tunisia without tyranny,” or (positively) “Tunisian populism.” In this way
“December 2010” is self-referencing, it is no longer one object among many within the
field o f appearance, but a self-determining object/site that will later be recalled by its
designation “December 2010” and also define itself as, “December 2010.” It is self
61 It is not the Pauline teaching that inaugurates the order o f an evental fidelity within the
order o f the historical, but the incamational event within the temporal order o f appearing.
Badiou was right here that the first “event,” completely from the perspective of historical
unfolding, ultimately failed (see below). Paul recognized this quite well. This is why he
was so little interested in the Jesus before the resurrection. More particularly, we are
speaking here o f the appearance of the Palestinian Jew Jesus, his revolutionary teaching,
his death, and the inscription o f the signification o f his resurrection into the present o f
history. While there may be truth in the Zizekian statement that “there is no Christ
outside Saint Paul,” it is simultaneously true that without Jesus (the site of the Event)
there is no Paul (the faithful subject to the evental trace). The man Jesus (his biography)
only takes on significance retroactively.
62 Badiou, Logics o f Worlds, 363.
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supportive, so that people will one day ask, (and perhaps already ask) “were you there
December 2010?” In a sense we are speaking here o f the coincidence o f the same, o f the
object and itself (now a site).

It is in the n that the subject body is always pressed to remain faithful to the
evental trace, here in the form of a point. For Badiou a point is that which minimally
confronts a faithful subject to make a decision which will have maximal consequences in
the newly constituted n. This point always takes a binary form, a 0/1, a Yes/No, an
Either/Or. Change can only take place i f these points are addressed faithfully, not when
these points are addressed. This is because the treatment o f a point may have minimal
consequences. This would mean o f course that any %informed by such a treatment would
remain the same, or result in minimal modification. A number o f questions follow: What
then is change? Is it only the consequence o f a pointal decision in fidelity to a truth? Can
a truly horrific decision be made, for example, to force the subjugation of a people
(consequences, albeit dire), and still be named “change?” Further, does this
understanding of “change” not elevate “novelty” to a sublime level (running perilously
close to capital’s methods)? Finally, reflecting on the earlier question o f change and
fidelity: what is Evil?
It would be helpful here to take a step from Badiou’s Logics o f Worlds to focus on
his Ethics. It should be clear by now that what we are speaking of when we speak of
“fidelity” and “change” is indeed ethics. Ethical considerations are the most important
aspect o f Badiou’s work. His ontological edifice, logic o f appearing, his notion o f the 63

63 Did the ancients not redesignate the object precisely to signify the junction of this
coincidence: thus Jacob becomes Israel.
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event, are all fundamentally situated within the horizon o f the question “what is the
Good?” This is because, for Badiou, the very question o f subjectivity hinges on the idea
of the Good, or o f the true. All progress is seen in terms o f working out a truth that we
have been seized by in a world. The opposite o f the true or the Good, is not Evil, nor is
Evil a lack or absence o f Good. For Badiou, Evil is a distortion in the field o f the Good
itself. There are three fundamental distortions o f the Good:
1) Simulacrum
2) Betrayal
3) Forced naming of the unnameable 64
To begin with, a fidelity to a simulacrum is just what the term suggests, fidelity to
a representation o f a faithful body, to that which represents itself as a body of a truth, but
is not. Here, if I may use a Biblical example, one might turn to the instance in Acts 15
wherein a council is called to settle the matter o f the relation between Jewish and Gentile
Christians. One faction staunchly defends the practice of circumcision and Law (these we
will call the Pharisaical faction), the other (whom we will refer to as the Pauline faction)
represented to the council in the persons o f St. Peter and St. James, defend the
universality o f the gospel, as St. Peter is reported to have said: “God, who knows the
heart, bore witness to them, by giving them the Holy Spirit just as he did to us, and he
made no distinction between us and them, having cleansed their hearts by faith .”65 Here,
in the manifestation of the gift o f the Holy Spirit, St. Peter recognizes the universality and
priority o f the faithful subject over any ethnicity or nationalism, over any political

64 Badiou, Ethics, 58.
65 Acts 15:8-9 (ESV). Emphasis mine.
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distinction. It is precisely this universality, not founded in any biological or national
substance that recognizes the trace o f a truth. Against this stands the Pharisaical faction
and its prescription o f the Law o f Moses and circumcision, the signs of a particular people
and creed, for ages associated with a particular national substance. Here a faction
attempts to regulate a break with a situation by adherence to an “abstract set :”66 i.e.
“Jewish.” By doing this a condition is set on the universality o f the event to which
subjects are faithful. It substantially de-universalizes the gospel by attaching predicates
to the definition o f a faithful subject, i.e. “circumcised” (in this case a predicate leaving
out half o f humanity!). In this particularizing o f the definition, there is indeed a form of a
fidelity. There is still a faithful subject, for example, who makes sacrifices, who lives in a
committed way, etc. But as we have seen, the two factions are in their essence
completely opposed to one another, the one particularizing and exclusive, the other
universalizing and inclusive.
It is to their profound credit that the early council remained faithful to the
universalizing core o f the gospel message. In their discussions we find the ideal
characteristic o f every true model o f faithful dialogue: an avoidance o f the ad hominem
terror:
For however hostile to a truth he might be, in the ethic o f truths every ‘some-one’
is always represented as capable o f becoming the Immortal that he is. So we may
fight against the judgments and opinions he exchanges with others for the purpose
o f corrupting every fidelity, but not against his person - which under the
circumstances, is insignificant, and to which, in any case, every truth is

66

Badiou, Ethics, 74.
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addressed.6768
It would be some years before this terror against the Person is enacted by Christians upon
one another, thereby becoming itself a simulacrum o f a faithful body: “Evil is the process
o f a simulacrum o f a truth. And in its essence, under a name o f its invention (politics,
science, love, etc) is terror directed at everyone.”

/ft

Here, years later, a simulacrum will

come to imitate the faithful body under the name o f its opposite: “Constantinian,”69 or
more ironically, “Catholic” Christianity.
Moreover, a betrayal is the failure o f the faithful subject to choose, at the place of
a crisis, to keep going. This crisis is marked by those subjective states experienced
commonly by revolutionary subjects after the initial victories, i.e. discouragement, lack o f
creative energy etc. It is the faithful subject, who at exactly this critical point, will rouse
herself:

67 Ibid, 76.
68 Ibid, 77.
69 Making an impassioned appeal for restoration, Arius, who was in Libya, fe lt the need to
write the Emperor, for all intense purposes the highest authority and strong arm of the
Church. That the Emperor saw himself this way is plain, for example:
“I myself, then, was the instrument whose services He chose, and esteemed suited
for the accomplishment o f his will. Accordingly, beginning at the remote
Britannic ocean, and the regions where, according to the law of nature, the sun
sinks beneath the horizon, through the aid o f divine power I banished and utterly
removed every form of evil which prevailed, in the hope that the human race,
enlightened through my instrumentality, might be recalled to a due observance of
the holy laws o f God, and at the same time our most blessed faith might prosper
under the guidance o f his almighty hand.” Eusebius Pamphilius, “The Life of
Constantine,” Ernest Cushing Richardson trans. (New York: Christian Literature
Publishing Co., 1890), 766.

29

A crisis o f fidelity is always what puts to the test, following the collapse of an
image, the sole maxim o f consistency (and thus o f ethics): ‘Keep going!’ Keep
going even when you have lost the thread, when you no longer feel ‘caught up’ in
the process, when the event itself has become obscure, when its name is lost, or
when it seems that it may have named a mistake, if not a simulacrum.70
The subject o f a betrayal, on the other hand, ultimately returns to the previous state before
the evental break. Using a biblical example we will attempt to discern, using the category
o f betrayal, at what point the constitution o f a faithful body appeared in the early
Christian narratives.
It seems obvious that the Biblical subject o f a betrayal par excellence is Judas
Iscariot. This seems obvious today too, when the term “Judas” is synonymous with all
types o f infidelities and disloyalties. Against this, it must be stated from the start that
Judas is not the subject o f betrayal we are primarily interested in. This is not because,
like the writer o f the gospel o f Judas, Judas should be seen as a hero, as the one disciple
o f Jesus willing to go all the way in his obedience to his master, betraying him to the
authorities in order that prophecy might be fulfilled etc. The view o f Judas here is much
less exalted. Contrary to Judas the hero (or even Judas the “Judas”) one should see
“Judas the Idealist,” a disciple who saw his Master in a far different light than the Master
him self understood. This should be clear by a reading o f the gospels Matthew and Mark,
in which Judas decides to part company with Jesus only after the incident with Mary and
the anointing. Here is Mark’s version o f it:
And while he was at Bethany in the house o f Simon the leper, as he was reclining
at table, a woman came with an alabaster flask o f ointment o f pure nard, very
costly, and she broke the flask and poured it over his head. There were some who
said to themselves indignantly, "Why was the ointment wasted like that? For this
70

Badiou, Ethics, 79.
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ointment could have been sold for more than three hundred denarii and given to
the poor." And they scolded her. But Jesus said, "Leave her alone. Why do you
trouble her? She has done a beautiful thing to me. For you always have the poor
with you, and whenever you want, you can do good for them. But you will not
always have me. She has done what she could; she has anointed my body
beforehand for burial. And truly, I say to you, wherever the gospel is proclaimed
in the whole world, what she has done will be told in memory of her." Then Judas
Iscariot, who was one o f the twelve, went to the chief priests in order to betray
71
him to them.
The Matthew version makes it clear that it was the “paGprai” (disciples) who objected to
the woman using her perfume thus.

In both gospels it is immediately after this incident

that Judas goes to the officials to make a deal with them. Is this not a clear case of
disillusionment? Judas, along with some other disciples, who had once heard the Saviour
say: “go sell all that you have and give the money to the poor” (Mark 10:21) here cannot
stand to see what appeared to them as wasteful, and a complete contradiction to his
Master’s previous answer to the question: “What must I do to inherit eternal life?” It is
Judas and these disciples who, contrary to the way John portrays him (John tells us only
Judas spoke up at this event, and that he did so only because he was a thief, John 12:4-6),
were acting consistently with the teachings o f Jesus. Whereas John and Luke demonize
Judas (both saying “Satan entered him” at this point; John 13:2, Luke 22:3), the gospels
o f Matthew and Mark merely state the facts: Judas left.

If Judas was guilty of anything712

71 Mark 14:3-10.
72 Matthew 26:8.
There are other inconsistencies here in John’s account. For example, John tells us that
Jesus, growing troubled, revealed to his disciples that one o f them would betray him.
Concerned, one o f the disciples asked Jesus who o f them it would be. Jesus told him it
would be the one who he gives a piece o f bread to after dipping it into the bowl. Oddly,
at this point, though it should have been obvious to at least one o f the disciples, no one
confronted or tried to restrain Judas, even though John tells us Jesus had passed him the
bread. Jesus further tells Judas to carry out his work o f betrayal, but John tells us: “Now
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at this point, it was surely over-zealousness. Surely his expectations o f the Messiah, and
the man who was proclaimed to be the Messiah, did not match up.*74 Does the timing not
indicate the unforgiving idealism o f the man? Judas does not betray Jesus after a great
defeat, or waning public acclaim, but at the high tide o f his popularity, at the very
moment all others were clambering to be near him, when just previously authorities did
not dare arrest him because of the riot it would provoke among the people (Mark 14:1-2;
Matt. 26:5). No, Judas is not the “Judas” one should find here. Here is merely an idealist
acting consistently with his ideals. For Judas, Jesus could not be said to do the same, and
as such, was not giving up a Messiah, but a pretender. This is something quite different
than betrayal. To locate betrayal, one must look to another o f Jesus’ disciples: Peter.
It was Peter who, rapidly seeing his dream o f glory vanish away, and because he
lacked courage, denied knowing Jesus, three times. At the point generated by the
accusation in the courtyard “You are one o f them” Peter has two choices. In fidelity to
his comrades and to the earlier affirmation o f an event in his statement “You are the
Christ,” Peter can once again affirm his allegiance, can acknowledge his devotion to the
man he once declared he would never betray. Or at this point of a crisis, Peter can erase
any trace o f his fidelity and revert to an earlier situation in which he “does not know the
man” (Mark 14:71). It is the latter that he chooses. It should be said, however, that Peter
here has a representative function, standing in for the once faithful body. It is clear that
they who said with Peter “If I must die with you, I will not deny you” (Mark 14: 31) all

no one at the table knew why he said this to him” (13:28), an obvious contradiction o f the
earlier account.
74 That Jesus was seen as the Messiah by his disciples was revealed some time earlier
(Mark 8:27-30).
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fled at the decisive moment, (with or without their clothing!). It would not be until a
much more radical break, turning on its head the previous situation in which the event
“Christ” had been inscribed, and thereby releasing retroactively the disciples from their
infidelity, that Peter and his comrades would be reinstated into the faithful body, this
time, (not without its own crises) to become the Immortals they became.

The former

event in which “Christ” meant not only non-hierarchical co-existence, but a kind of
ethnic/nationalism, was to become seen retroactively as a simulacrum o f a truth process,
as too particular in its consequences. It should be pointed out that it was not this
particularist version o f the Christ event that Judas was betraying, as if he foresaw the later
more universal event-implications that would take place. The evental character o f the
second Christ-event retroactively designates the previous one inadequate (though
necessary), what Badiou might call a false-event. One sees in the fleeing o f the disciples
and in the outright betrayal o f any association with the Nazarene, that the consequences
o f this initial evental sequence (his Christological determination) were minimal, i.e. zero.
The death and what led up to it cannot be named “event.” Badiou makes a similar point
in his Saint Paul, in that it is not the death o f Jesus that should be seen as the event, but
the resurrection-event:
Death, which is the thought o f (=according to) the flesh cannot be constitutive of
the Christ-event. Death is, moreover, an Adamic phenomenon. It was, properly
speaking, invented by Adam, the first man. 1 Corinthians 15.22 is perfectly clear
on this point: “For as by a man came death, by a man has come also the
resurrection o f the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made
alive.” Death is as ancient as the first man’s choice o f a rebellious freedom. What
constitutes an event in Christ is exclusively the Resurrection, that anastasis75
75 See discussion concerning “disinterested-interest” above for Badiou’s notion of
“Immortal.”
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nekron that should be translated as the raising up o f the dead, their uprising, which
is the uprising o f life.767
For the reason that his life was only a continuation o f Adamic mortality, that death was
already an “invention” o f the first man (i.e. it was not a form of creative novelty), for the
reason also that his life and death had minimal consequences, that they failed to produce a
revolutionary community or body living in fidelity to his teachings, one should indeed
find here in his life and death a false-event.
The third distortion o f the Good, or Evil, is the forced naming o f an unnameable.
What does Badiou mean by this? This concerns a truth’s ability to transform a language
world, to challenge opinion, to reconstitute it. Within the biblical context, perhaps a
perfect example o f this ability o f a truth to transform opinion is the encounter between
Thomas and the risen Jesus. Thomas is o f the opinion that dead men do not come out o f
their graves and live again.

It is only after meeting the once dead Jesus that within the

field o f Thomas’ experience a radical change o f opinion must come about. This is not yet
the forcing o f an unnameable, but is the proper functioning o f a truth within the field of
opinion. Like the faithful subject, an opinion is not truth, but is changed in response to a
truth:
Not that these opinions become ‘true’ (or false). They are not capable of truth,
and a truth, in its eternal multiple-being, remains indifferent to opinions. But they

76 Badiou, Saint Paul, 68.
77

Is this not another contradictory situation in that Thomas must have surely seen Lazarus
raised from the dead (John tells us specifically that Thomas was there, John 11:16, 44)?
Is the Nazarene’s resurrection from the dead that miraculous in the context o f this series
o f resurrections? Why Thomas’ refusal to believe before being presented with the
evidence?
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become other. This means that formerly obvious judgements are no longer
defensible, that others become necessary, that the means of communication
change, and so on. I have called this reorganization o f opinions the power
[puissance] of truths.
It is the desire to force an opinion, at the cost o f the absolute elimination o f all other
opinion, that is an Evil. This should not be confused with a relativistic reading that
conflates the notion o f truth with opinion and therefore particularizes truth to “cultural
truths,” “ethnic truths,” “truths o f personal taste,” etc. As we have seen, for Badiou, no
opinion is truth. What an opinion reorganized under the puissance o f a truth recognizes is
the possibility o f another break, the possibility o f an -other of an opinion. What a forced
naming o f an unnameable concerns is the elimination o f the human animal in the form of
its opinion, the very thing that composes this subjective animal.

But what is this

“unnameable” that is being forced to be named? Forcing an opinion absolutely is one
thing, but in what way is this related to the unnameable? For Badiou, the unnameable of
a situation is that element which resists naming by a truth, and so is indicative o f the
limited power o f truth within any given situation. It is the element o f the situation that
may be discussed or debated, but resists being commandeered by the subject o f a truth. It
is an element that cannot be Immortalized.787980 In fact, any attempt to do so would result in
disaster.
This is precisely why Connor Cunningham’s critique o f Badiou falls short o f the
mark. In his rush to ascribe to nihilistic thinkers (not undeservedly) the reduction o f all
78 Badiou, Ethics, 80.
79 Ibid., 85.
80 Ibid., 86.
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being to monochromatic “pure reality, absolute shit, devoid o f shape and distinction,

5?81

he misses Badiou’s contribution to the discussion here. For example, Cunningham,
drawing on these conclusions, states:
...this ‘truth’[of the indifference o f the Void o f Being] can be ‘witnessed’ - the
Real o f eros is seen - as it erupts, striking out from underneath the settled hen in
the form o f rape; but rape is no more or less dramatic than other manifestations of
univocal desire. Was this not what the great masters o f suspicion had begun to tell
us, for each in his own way pointed us beyond the facade o f the name, to the
pulsating reality that lay behind the accepted account?8182
But it is Badiou who in his Ethics enables one to think the very difference Cunningham
accuses the nihilists o f not allowing, while simultaneously affirming an ultimate univocity
o f multiple-being. A Badiouan response would therefore be that rape is that Evil which
forces the naming o f ‘sexual pleasure’ (an unnameable), a naming which cannot be forced
without disastrous consequences, precisely because sexual pleasure is not a category o f a
truth. In a similar way it was the Nazi designation o f a community as
“German/Germany,” o f assigning truth to the synthesis German/community (of
privileging this identification), that a disaster befell the world.83 So at the same time there
is non-monochromatic difference (the Evil o f naming/the unnameable), there is also an
order o f the Same (rape as a distortion o f the fie ld “sexual pleasure,” o f eros). Rape is
this absolutization o f sexual pleasure, a distortion o f a truth concerning the Two. Its
81 Connor Cunningham, Genealogy o f Nihilism: Philosophies o f nothing and the
difference o f theology (London: Routledge, 2002), 257. John Milbank draws heavily on
Cunningham for his critique o f Badiou. See, for example, John Milbank, “Materialism
and Transcendence” in Theology and the Political: The New Debate (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2002).
82 Ibid., 256.
83 Badiou, Ethics, 86.
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naming completely ignores the dual nature o f the subject: that between its basic animal
interests, its animality, which as Nietzsche pointed out involves a completely different
category than Good or Evil; and that of its composition as a subject-to-truths.

Could

this have been the root o f Judas’ idealism? In his desire to force the naming o f a particular
form o f Messiah, to inflexibly designate it as the form, he ultimately defeated himself, a
literal dis-aster befalling him.
In the three distortions o f the Good, or Evil: the simulacrum, betrayal, forced
naming, one now observes the three negative possibilities open to the faithful subject-toa-truth. Having answered the previous question, “what is Evil?” we are now in a position
to answer the earlier question regarding change. For Badiou, change is indeed the result
o f (and results in) a faithful pointal decision. “Change” should be equated with “novelty”
insofar as one thinks o f a break in a situation. This break occurs not just at the level of
language and knowledge, by introducing a new name in a situation, a discontinuation in
the order o f a situation’s linguistic or encyclopaedic regime, but also in a subject,
actualizing the “disinterested-interested”8485 constituent o f the human animal, a process
realizing the potential all have to be Immortal. This is why Badiou predicates his notion
o f novelty with “creative.” Within the establishment o f capital “novelty” is never
“creative” in that it is little more than self-perpetuating production punctuated by varying
material commodification. There is no break in the established process in other words,
but rather a powerful (perhaps unstoppable) re-production. The evental break, on the
other hand, is not o f the same order of a situation. It is a hole “punched” in the
84 Ibid., Chapter 5.
85

Ibid., 49.
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situation,8687*manifested by the appearance o f what was not there before. Change is
therefore associated with the “after” o f an appearance, in this appearance itself, founded
within the order o f the name and the subject: within its languages and bodies, and within
the order of a truth.
Let us take, for example, the situation “France 1791.” Here we may locate a break
within the situation which we will identify with the names “Déclaration des droits de la
fem m e et de la citoyenne’'’ or “Politics o f Equality.” It was common, before this break, for
“woman” to be reduced in the following ways:
Les hommes, par la prérogative de leur sexe & par la force de leur tempérament,
sont naturellement capables de toutes sortes d'emplois & d'engagemens; au lieu
que les femmes, soit à cause de la fragilité de leur sexe & de leur délicatesse
naturelle, sont excluses de plusieurs fonctions, & incapables de certains
87
engagemens.
[Men, by right o f their sex and by the strength o f their temperament, are naturally
capable o f a variety o f jobs and engagements; while women, either because of the
fragility o f their sex and natural sensitivity, are excluded from several duties, and
incapable o f certain engagements.]
Or again:
On dit vulgairement qu'il faut deux femmes pour faire un témoin: ce n'est pas
néanmoins que les dépositions des femmes se comptent dans cette proportion
arithmétique, relativement aux dépositions des hommes, cela est seulement fondé
sur ce que le témoignage des femmes en général est leger & sujet à variation; c'est
SO
pourquoi l'on y a moins d'égard qu'aux dépositions des hommes.

86 Ibid., 43.
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Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d'Argis, "Femme," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné
des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 6:475—476.
88 Ail translations are my own unless otherwise credited.
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Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d'Argis, "Femme," Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné
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[It is commonly said that it takes two women to testify: it is not, however, that the
testimony o f women is counted in this arithmetical proportion relative to the
testimony o f men; it is merely based on the fact that the testimony o f women in
general is light and subject to change; this is why it is held in less respect than
statements o f men.]

And finally:
La nature semble avoir conféré aux hommes le droit de gouverner. Les femmes ont
eu recours à l'art pour s'affranchir.90
[Nature seems to have given men the right to govern. Women have had recourse
to art for emancipation.]
Within the situations duty, voice, and governance, one finds a view o f women that
ascribes a hierarchy within nature itself. In the situation named “duty” a woman is by
nature not just unequal to men, but so fragile as to exclude her from it altogether. In the
situation named “voice” a woman may be included but on the condition her testimony is
supplemented by another. Despite Boucher’s assurance that this is not because 1+1=1, is
his justification not fundamentally a mathematical formulation, as if supplementing the
voice of one woman with another’s somehow does “add up” to a man’s testimony?
Finally, in the situation named “governance” it is declared a matter o f natural right that a
man should govern, while on the other hand, a woman is not given recourse to the
political i.e. she is denied the right not only to govern, but to free herself from oppression
by political means. The negation o f woman in each o f these situations (duty, voice,
governance) is the negation o f participation in the political sphere. This is the situation
“France 1791” in which the break “Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne”
will take place. Even after the previous break named “Déclaration des droits de l'Homme

90 Joseph-François-Édouard de Corsembleu de Desmahis, "Femme," Encyclopédie ou
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, 6:473 (Paris, 1756).
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et du citoyen’'’ o f 1789, which declared that “Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et
égaux en droits” [Men are bom and remain free and equal in rights], there arose the
question o f the place o f “femme” within the designation “hommes.” That the declaration
o f 1789 did not provide an answer in the positive was so clearly pointed out by the
Marquis de Condorcet:
Il est même quelques-unes de ces violations qui ont échappé aux philosophes et
aux législateurs, lorsqu’ils s’occupaient avec le plus de zèle d’établir les droits
communs des individus de l’espèce humaine, et d’en faire le fondement unique
des institutions politiques.
Par exemple, tous n ’ont-ils pas violé le principe de l’égalité des droits, en privant
tranquillement la moitié du genre humain de celui de concourir à la formation des
lois, en excluant les femmes du droit de cité ? Est-il une plus forte preuve du
pouvoir de l’habitude, même sur les hommes éclairés, que de voir invoquer le
principe de l’égalité des droits en faveur de trois ou quatre cents hommes qu’un
préjugé absurde en avait privés, et l’oublier à l’égard de douze millions de
femmes?91
[There is even some of these violations (of their droits naturels) that have escaped
the philosophers and legislators, even when they were zealously involved with
establishing the common rights o f individuals o f the human species, and in this
way making a unique foundation o f political institutions.
For example, have they not all violated the principle o f equal rights, quietly
depriving half the human race from contributing to the formation of laws, by
excluding women from the rights o f citizenship? Is there any stronger proof o f the
power o f habit, even in regard to enlightened men, than to see the invocation of
the principle o f equal rights for three or four hundred men who had been deprived
for an absurd private prejudice, and yet fail to take into consideration twelve
million women?]
So at this first sign o f a break in the old order one can detect the shift in language, bodies,
and a truth, i.e. the first sign o f Change, or more correctly, the first Change. This came

91 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, 1790. Available online Sur
l’admission des femmes au droit de cite. Online, L'université du Québec à Chicoutimi,
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/condorcet/ admission_femmes_droit_de_cite/
admission_femmes_droit_de_cite.html accessed January 05,2011.
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about at the place o f a point: the point where a faithful subject must decide in favour of
fidelity to the spirit o f the revolutionary maxim: “Les hommes naissent et demeurent
libres et égaux en droits” or to betray it. The situation “France 1791” will see the
deployment o f a new language, body, and a truth:
A language: for the first time in the name “femme” or “woman.”
A body: in the feminine as non-supplement, as value-autonomous.

A truth: the subjective equality o f both woman and man, not just by nature, but
by right.

A break finally comes with the Declaration o f September 1791. In it Olympe de Gouges,
in complete fidelity to the Revolution, will declare:

Article I: “La Femme naît libre et demeure égale à l’homme en droits.”

Q9

[Woman is bom free and remains equal to man in rights.]

Article X: Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions mêmes fondamentales, la
femme a le droit de monter sur l 'échafaud; elle doit avoir également celui de
monter à la Tribune; pourvu que ses manifestations ne troublent pas l'ordre public
établi par la Loi.
[No person shall be molested for his most basic opinions, the woman has the right
to mount the scaffold, she must equally have the right to mount the
rostrum, provided that her public activities do not disturb the public order
established by the Law.]

Article VI: “La Loi doit être l'expression de la volonté générale; toutes les
Citoyennes et Citoyens doivent concourir personnellement ou par leurs
représentants, à sa formation; elle doit être la même pour tous: toutes les
Citoyennes et tous les Citoyens, étant égaux à ses yeux, doivent être également
admissibles à toutes dignités, places et emplois publics, selon leurs capacités, et
sans autres distinctions que celles de leurs vertus et de leurs talents.”
[The Law must be an expression o f the general will, and all citizens
must participate personally or through their representatives in its
Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne de 1791 Olympe de
Gouges.Online, In Libro Vertitas, available from
http://www.inlibroveritas.net/lire/oeuvrel465.html.
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formation; it must be the same for everyone: all female and male
citizens, being equal in its eyes, should be equally eligible to all dignities, public
places and employments, according to their capabilities, and without
other distinctions than those o f their virtues and talents.]

In these three declarative articles, de Gouges names the inexistent o f the three previous
situations duty, voice, and governance: that is “woman”:

Duty: Against the natural absence o f woman in the order o f rights and her
inability to perform a duty: The affirmation o f her existence and equality in right
and liberty (Article I).
Voice: Against the necessary supplementation o f her testimony: Woman’s voice
must be heard without hierarchical prejudice, from equally high places as any
man, and with equal weight (Article X).
G overnance: Against the claim that woman is by nature not suited to govern, that
she is by nature not political: Woman, by nature and by right must not be excluded
from politically participating in all “dignités” or public employment.

In should now be understood what Badiou means by a break in a situation, a hole
punched in the presented order. The rupture in the situation “France 1791” named a
previous inexistent, the appearance o f a previously unnamed political subject, the
consequences o f which extend to this day. That this subject would not return to its former
inexistence (as the disciples o f the Nazarene) is made clear in the statement: “la fem me a
le droit de monter sur l 'échafaud, ” and its author certainly did, on November 3,1793,
rather than betray her fidelity.

1.4 Political Praxis
In a 2007 interview entitled “We Need a Popular Discipline: Contemporary
Politics and the Crisis of the Negative,” Alain Badiou outlines what he sees as the form of
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any future evental politics. It quickly becomes apparent that he has cut ties with any
notion o f state politics, o f the traditional Leninist model o f a proletariat seizure o f state
mechanisms, in favour o f something many Christians would recognize as an autonomous,
yet cooperative ecclesiological structure. What is his issue with the state model? Simply
put, it has no staying power. It tends to become bureaucratized, or to compromise its
initial values and goals. “It’s clear that the Party-State was a failure. From the point o f
view o f taking power, the Party was victorious. But not from the perspective of
exercising power.”93 In addition to this failure, Badiou is also critical of any application
o f political terror to accomplish one’s goals today, at least in any offensive manner. This
form o f political violence is a negation, what Badiou refers to as the “negative part of
negation”94 its properly destructive element. “Contrary to Hegel, for whom the negation
o f the negation produces a new affirmation, I think we must assert that today negativity,
properly speaking, does not create anything new. It destroys the old, o f course, but does
not give rise to a new creation.”95 Here is the crux o f the matter, while it is possible to
remove the old regime, its replacement soon becomes almost indistinguishable from it.
Destruction in itself is futile without the proper fidelity to create something new. This is
why, for Badiou, violence remains a necessarily defensive gesture. He makes his position
clear in recent comments on the events in Egypt and Tunisia:
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Alain Badiou, “We Need a Popular Discipline: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of
the Negative,” Critical Inquiry'll (Summer2008), interview by Filippo del Luchesse and
Jason Smith, Los Angeles, 02/07/07.
94 Ibid, 5.
95

Ibid.

43

Dans la foulée d'un événement, le peuple se compose de ceux qui savent résoudre
les problèmes que l'événement leur pose. Ainsi de l'occupation d'une place :
nourriture, couchage, garde, banderoles, prières, combats défensifs, de telle sorte
que le lieu où tout se passe, le lieu qui fait symbole, soit gardé à son peuple, à tout
prix...
Nous ne voulons pas la guerre, mais nous n'en avons pas peur. On a partout parlé
du calme pacifique des manifestations gigantesques, et on a lié ce calme à l'idéal
de démocratie élective qu'on prêtait au mouvement. Constatons cependant qu'il y a
eu des morts par centaines, et qu'il y en a encore chaque jour. Dans bien des cas,
ces morts ont été des combattants et des martyrs de l'initiative, puis de la
protection du mouvement lui-même. Les lieux politiques et symboliques du
soulèvement ont dû être gardés au prix de combats féroces contre les miliciens et
les polices des régimes menacés. Et là, qui a payé de sa personne, sinon les jeunes
issus des populations les plus pauvres ? Que les "classes moyennes", dont notre
inespérée Michèle Alliot-Marie a dit que l'aboutissement démocratique de la
séquence en cours dépendait d'elles et d'elles seules, se souviennent qu'au moment
crucial, la durée du soulèvement n'a été garantie que par l'engagement sans
restriction de détachements populaires. La violence défensive est inévitable. Elle
se poursuit du reste, dans des conditions difficiles, en Tunisie, après qu'on ait
renvoyé à leur misère les jeunes activistes provinciaux.96
[In the wake o f an event, “the people” is composed o f those who know how to
resolve the problems the event presents to them. And so the occupation o f a
place: food, sleeping space, protection, pennants, prayers, defensive battles, all so
that the place where everything takes place, the place which has become a symbol,
will be kept by its people, at all costs...
We do not want war, but we have no fear o f it. Everywhere the pacifist calm of
the huge demonstrations has been talked of, and that calm has been linked to the
ideal o f elective democracy that we have lent to the movement. We should,
however, note that there have been deaths by the hundreds, and each day there are
more. In many cases the dead have been fighters and martyrs o f the initiative,
then later, o f the protection o f the movement itself. Political and symbolic places
o f the uprising had to be held at the cost o f fierce fighting against the militias and
police o f the threatened regimes. And there, who has paid with their lives if not
the youths from the poorest o f the population? The “middle classes,” of whom
our inspired Michèle Alliot-Marie has said that the democratic outcome o f the
sequence depended on them and them alone, should remember that at the crucial
moment, the duration o f the movement was only guaranteed by the unfettered
commitment o f the people’s militia. Defensive violence is inevitable. It

96 Tunisie, Egypte : quand un vent d'est balaie l'arrogance de l'Occident. Online, Le
Monde, available from http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/02/18/tunisie-egyptequand-un-vent-d-est-balaie-l-arrogance-de-l-occident_1481712_3232.html. accessed
February 13, 2011.
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continues, in difficult conditions, in Tunisia, after the young provincial activists
have been returned to their wretched poverty.]

That political violence is seen as a defensive measure indicates the separatist nature of his
political endeavour. In Badiou’s terms, any evental political body today must “subtract”
itself from the State and its mechanisms, it takes the form o f “a politics without party.”97
This body autonomously creates itself, makes its own designations concerning itself,
carrying on as if the State’s injunctions have no sway:
At a distance from the State" signifies that a politics is not structured or polarized
along the agenda and timelines fixed by the State. Those dates, for example, when
the State decides to call an election, or to intervene in some conflict, declare war
on another state. Or when the State claims that an economic crisis makes this or
that course o f action impossible. These are all examples o f what I call
"convocations by the State," where the State sets the agenda and controls the
timing o f political events. Distance from the State means you act with a sufficient
independence from the State and what it deems to be important or not, who it
decides should be addressed or not. This distance protects political practices from
being oriented, structured and polarized by the State.98
This kind o f “in the world but not o f the world” politics is necessarily subtractive, a
negation o f the State apparatus, but not a destruction o f the State and its laws. This is
why Badiou makes the distinction between a negative negation (utter destruction) and
subtractive negation (a non-dependence on State law and political mechanisms) within
the regime o f an autonomous evental politics. One is reminded here o f an early
Christianity in which religious fidelity carried on regardless of State suppression or
directive to the contrary, this without a concerted effort to destroy that which went to
great effort to do the opposite. Here the Christian notion o f a separate Kingdom, a
Q7
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separate space o f fidelity and political actualization, is to the point. The difference, o f
course, is that early Christians prayed for the wellbeing of the State and its administrators,
it abstained from physical violence even in the arena, even while praying “Thy Kingdom
come.” There was no use o f “defensive violence” per se ." More contemporary examples
o f self-identifying Christian sects along these lines are the Jehovah Witnesses or
Anabaptist groups (Hutterites, Mennonites, etc). Though they have diverging theologies,
their insistence on subtraction from the political are similar. The Witnesses, for example,
share that attitude described (accurate or not o f 1st century Christians) by Augustus
Neander in his classic The History o f the Christian Religion and Church, During the
Three First Centuries: ”
“The Christians stood aloof and distinct from the state, as a priestly and spiritual
race, and Christianity seemed able to influence civil life only in that manner
which, it must be confessed, is the purest, by practically endeavouring to instil
more and more o f holy feeling into the citizens o f the state.”99100

This “aloofness” also translated into pacifism on both sides o f the World Wars and
conflicts ever since. Those Witnesses who did participate would simply “fire their
weapons into the air” or attempt to “knock their opponents weapons from their hands”
rather than actually harm anyone.101 Within the Christian Anabaptist tradition a similar

991 say, “per se” because it seems obvious that even if early Christians refused to
physically harm those who attacked them, the event o f Christianity itself soon caused a
violent rupture in the fabric o f the ancient world.
100 Augustus Neander, The History o f the Christian Religion and Church, During the
Three First Centuries (Philadelphia: James M Campbell, 1844), 168.
101 Jehovah ’s Witnesses: Proclaimers o f G od’s Kingdom (New York: Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society o f New York, Inc, 1993), 191. Which begs the question, why
participate at all? The response from the Witnesses is that Christians are also commanded
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pacifism due to its conception o f a separation between Church and State, was
demonstrated well in the Schleitheim Confession o f 1527:
Lastly, one can see in the following points that it does not befit a Christian to be a
magistrate: the rule o f the government is according to the flesh, that of the
Christians according to the Spirit. Their houses and dwelling remain in this world,
that o f the Christians is in heaven. Their citizenship is in this world, that o f the
Christians is in heaven. The weapons o f their battle and warfare are carnal and
only against the flesh, but the weapons o f Christians are spiritual, against the
fortification of the devil. The worldly are armed with steel and iron, but Christians
are armed with the armor o f God, with truth, righteousness, peace, faith, salvation,
and with the Word o f God. In sum: as Christ our Head is minded, so also must be
minded the members o f the body o f Christ through Him, so that there be no
division in the body, through which it would be destroyed.102
Certainly these Christian sects qualify as a subtractive form o f the political, complete with
their own internal organization and means o f resolving internal problems. These are
merely the predominantly Western forms. In the vast slums o f Nigeria, for example,
Pentecostal Christianity provides an organizational framework in which basic needs are
met at all levels aside from any State support (in many cases completely absent). Within
the modem Western context however, is it not fair to say these groups are almost
altogether marginalized? Is not their subtractive stance isolationist, resulting in the exact
opposite o f what Neander characterized as an endeavour to “to instil more and more of
holy feeling into the citizens o f the state,” instead limiting themselves to the particularity
of their own religious communities? Here the critique might spill over on to Badiou’s
own subtractive politics. Does “distance from the State” not simply equate with

to “obey the powers that be” (Ibid). Does this not lead to a kind o f Batesonian “double
bind,” in which a person is caught between two conflicting injunctions that demand equal
satisfaction?
1(Y )

Schleitheim Confession. Online, Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia,
available from http://www.gameo.Org/encyclopedia/contents/S345.html#ART6.
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“alternative community,” in his case one that, unlike interest groups which can form
powerful voting blocs, does not even participate in State forms of the democratic process,
and as such risk becoming as marginalized as Mennonite or Hutterite groups (regardless
o f their many positive features)?
Badiou’s notion o f “distance from the state” is no doubt a consequence o f his
ontology, o f his understanding o f the event. In what way? One must keep in mind that
the event is unpredictable, as we have discussed earlier in his third thesis: “Every
universal originates in an event, and the event is intransitive to the particularity o f the
situation.” No one can “see it coming.” It breaks with all particular predicates at the very
moment it cuts across them. Because it cannot be tethered to a specific identity or
culture, it cannot be registered ahead o f time at the level o f the historical-particular:

1 f i 'i

“An event is never the concentration o f a vital continuity, or the immanent
intensification o f a becoming. It is never coextensive with becoming. It is, on the
contrary, on the side o f a pure break with the becoming o f an object of the world,
through the auto-apparition o f this object. Correlatively, it is the supplementation
o f apparition [/ ’apparaître] by the emergence [surgissement] o f a trace: what
formerly inexisted becomes intense existence.”103104

103 Here one might find some similarity between Badiou’s notion o f an Event and Jürgen
Moltmann’s idea o f nova creatio. In order to allow for the possibility o f the Resurrection,
Moltmann must ground it in the contingentia mundi, a result o f God’s free creative act.
Theology may find some support in modem quantum theories o f the universes’ origins
(spontaneous quantum creation o f the universe from quantum fluctuations), themselves a
product o f physical laws (and thus no need for divine directive, unless of course these
laws are seen as divinely created). In the end, however, Moltmann’s intellectus fldei
resurrectionis is still a fides quaerens intellectum, taking the Resurrection a priori as a
starting point of all theo-historical constructions. In addition, one must question
Moltmann’s identification o f divine freedom with contingency: Is something truly
contingent that has necessarily been willed? See Jürgen Moltmann, Theology o f Hope
(London: SCM Press, 1967), 177-180.
104

Alain Badiou, “The Event in Deleuze,” Parrhesia, 2 (2007), 39.
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One must simply be watchful and wait for the event to take place,
“The philosopher is useful, because he or she has the task of observing the
morning o f a truth, and o f interpreting this new truth over against old opinions...
When we feel that a truth-event interrupts the continuity o f ordinary life, we have
to say to others: "Wake up! The time of new thinking and acting is here!" But for
that, we ourselves must be awake. We, philosophers, are not allowed to sleep. A
philosopher is a poor night watchman.” 05
Here Badiou also connects the notion of “acting” and “confession.” The former proceeds
from the latter. It is only in light o f an event and the subsequent recognition that such an
event has taken place that faithful action can take place. Adrian Johnston has called this
form o f waiting “communist patience,” the “calm contemplation of the details of
situations, states, and worlds with an eye to the discerning o f ideologically veiled weak
points in the structural architecture o f the statist system.”105106 Does this characterization
not sound startling familiar to a kind o f Christian eschatological waiting, a Badiouan
version o f watching for the “signs o f the end,” awaiting what Johnston calls the
“unpredictable arrival o f a not-to-be-actively-precipitated ‘x ’ sparking genuine
change”?107108 This could equally be applied to the resurrection (we have already
determined the Death o f Jesus was a non-event) or to the future “x” o f the parousial
consummation awaited by not just Anabaptist and Jehovah Witnesses, but a great number
o f Christians in general.

Saint Paul’s advice to the Thessalonians does not sound out of

105Alain Badiou, http://www.lacan.com/symptom8_articles/badioul8.htmlPhilosophy as
Creative Repetition
106 Adrian Johnston, “The Quick and the Dead: Alain Badiou and the Split Speeds o f
Transformation,” International Journal o f Zizek Studies, 1:2 (2007), 81-82.
107 Johnston, 82.
108 There are o f course exceptions to this “not-to-be-actively” designation. For example,
for 50USD Benny Hinn ministries will plant a tree for you in Israel in a gesture to prepare
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place here: “You should mind your own business and work with your hands, just as we
told you, so that your daily life may win the respect o f outsiders and so that you will not
be dependent on anybody.”109 It is no wonder that Slavoj Zizek has criticized Badiou
here, referring to the latter’s position as an “active quietism” that forever postpones the
evental act, taking part in “small interventions with the secret hope that somehow,
inexplicably, by means o f a magic ‘leap from quality to quantity,’ they will lead to global
radical change.” 110 There is, however, a critical difference here between a Christian
waiting and Badiou’s communist one. While Badiou risks slipping into quietism by
subtracting himself from the dominant forms o f political participation and waiting for the
right moment to strike, to arouse the masses by testifying to the event that has just taken
place, his justification can only ever be this-worldly, i.e. there is, ipso facto, no guarantee
that an event will take place. It is completely contingent on the actualizing process o f a
truth in a situation o f the world (here understood in its global sense). Badiou explicitly
acknowledges that:
“It is always possible that no event actually occur. Strictly speaking, a site is only
‘evental’ insofar as it is retroactively qualified as such by the occurrence o f an
the way for the return o f Christ: “Yet the truly exciting part o f all this is that tree planting
and widespread vegetation in the Land o f the Bible is not only tied to biblical prophecy
concerning the nation o f Israel, but it has a direct connection to the prophecy about the
soon return o f our Lord Jesus Christ.”
http://www.bennyhinn.org/products/product_detail.cfm?itemid=718. What Hinn
ministries does not tell you is that in order to prepare the land for planting, hundreds or
perhaps even (eventually) thousands o f Bedouin people have had their homes demolished
and forced to move, see for example, Bedouin tribes' land fears over God-TV's tree
planting. Online, The National, http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middleeast/bedouin-tribes-land-fears-over-god-tvs-tree-planting accessed December 28,2010.
1091 Thessalonians 4:11-12 (New International Version 2011).
110 Zizek, Defense o f Lost Causes, 391.
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event... Therefore, there is no event save relative to a historical situation, even if a
historical situation does not necessarily produce events.”111
But precisely because o f this is this waiting not fundamentally irrational, since as we
have seen an event is never the “concentration o f a vital continuity, or the immanent
intensification o f a becoming?” Can a charge not be laid, therefore, that an evental
subject is necessarily a fideistic subject? The Christian form o f waiting, however, is
founded on an unshakeable conviction that the parousial event will take place. It is not a
question o f “i f ’ but “when.” As such, Christian waiting is guaranteed by a divine Other,
a definitely presumed to exist “X,” mediated through the form o f a “promise” and in this
strict sense, is a rational waiting. “In this strict sense” is here applied to the situation
“Christian hope,” a situation predicated with a religious designation. Within this
circularity, hope in this promise has an internal rationality, like the rules of a game by
which a participant’s subjective disposition is mediated, always with a specific goal in
mind. Characterized this way, Badiou’s position is more akin to a game in which no
matter how many times the dice are rolled, there is not only no specific goal, there is not
even a guarantee that the roll o f the die itself has any substantial meaning. This is the
case because for Badiou an event is only ever recognized as such retroactively. This is a
Pascalian wager if there ever was one.
Here both Zizek and Johnston suggest an alternative to not only a strict Badiouan
post-evental recognition o f the event, but the possibility that actors may even be able to
precipitate the event itself.

in Badiou, Being and Event, 179. Italics are Badiou’s.
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One cannot ever be sure in advance if what appears (within the register and the
space o f the visibility o f the ruling ideology) as “minor” measures will not set in
motion a process that will lead to the radical (evental) transformation o f the whole
field. There are situations in which a minimal measure o f social reform can have
a much stronger large-scale consequences than self-professed “radical”
changes...112*
For Johnston this translates
into a kind o f pre-evental subjectivity, an idea Badiou is
1iq
strictly opposed to:
Given the theoretical validity o f assuming that these camouflaged Achilles’ heels
(as hidden evental sites) can and do exist in one’s worldly context, one should be
patiently hopeful that one’s apparently minor gestures, carried out under the
guidance o f a pre-evental surveillance o f the situation in search o f its concealed
kernels o f real transformation, might come to unleash major repercussions for the
state-of-the-situation and/or transcendental regime o f the world. In other words,
it’s reasonable to anticipate that seemingly circumscribed and constrained regional
projects, if carefully targeted under the guidance o f the proper sort o f ideology
critique, might actually result in fundamental reality-altering reverberations...11415
Prior to the subject-recognized occurrence o f an event, individuals practicing a
certain variety o f subtractive politics are quite justified in hoping to find, through
a careful examination o f their situation, figures and sites that are both specific-butnot-specified (Hallward) as well as capable o f shifting from appearing to be notquite-evental loci in the eyes o f pre-evental present anticipation to becoming
powerful disruptions in post-evental future hindsight (Eagleton). In other words,
subtractive politics could productively be thought o f as deploying a pre-evental
subjective inquiry or investigation...1 5
V

In Christian terms the difference between Badiou and Zizek/Johnston may be likened to
the difference between Saint Paul’s Thessalonians (leading quiet lives and working with
their hands, ever watchful, etc) and the patient activity o f contemporary missionary
Christians who earnestly believe that once the gospel is “preached in the whole world as a

112 Z iiek, Defense o f Lost Causes, 390.
W 'X

Remember that a “subject” is only inaugurated by fidelity to the event.

114 Johnston, 29.
115 Johnston, 25.
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testimony to all nations” the “end will come,” 116 generally indicative o f a certain sort of
Protestant Evangelical approach to the matter.
For example, some time ago I was the group leader o f a Bible translation team
based in Fort W orth Texas. Our work group travelled to Guinea, West Africa a number
o f times to render assistance to Bible translators in the field, provide medical care for
local communities, and collect various cultural data for later dissemination among future
missionaries (this to increase efficiency and cultural sensitivity). It was a commonly held
sentiment among the translators that their missionary activity was part of the Great
Commission o f Matthew 28,117 and made an implicit connection here to the immanent
return o f Christ. There was therefore a sense o f immediacy in everything they did. They
continually had to surmount what one missionary referred to as a “generational obstacle.”
It was not enough that the gospel was preached in every nation and place, it also had to
reach every individual. Because people naturally (sometimes not so naturally) age and
pass away, there was no guarantee that younger generations would hear o f Jesus and have
the opportunity to make a personal and informed decision. The translated Bibles were a
way to overcome this obstacle. Ironically this held true even with the group o f people I
lived with, who as it turns out, belonged to an oral culture. The missionaries therefore
had not only to translate the Bible in the local language (Yalunka as it happened to be),
they had to literally invent an alphabet and teach the people how to read in their own
116 Matthew 24:14 (New International Version 2011). O f course not supplemented with
the big Other’s guarantee o f meaning.
117 “Therefore go and make disciples o f all nations, baptizing them in the name o f the
Father and o f the Son and o f the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have
commanded you.” Matthew 28:19-20. Also Matthew 24:14: “And this gospel o f the
kingdom will be preached in the whole world as a testimony to all nations, and then the
end will come.”
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language. Incredibly these missionaries were ushering in a cultural shift from an oral
society to a “literate” one!
Unlike the Christian examples above, both Zizek/Johnston and Badiou do not
speak in terms o f an evental guarantee. Both are the active and passive sides o f the same
coin it would seem. This is especially the case when one observes that neither Zizek nor
Johnston speak o f one’s activity necessitating an event. They are purposively ambiguous
here, saying one’s activity “might” or “can” result in an evental upheaval. For this reason
they are merely more optimistic types o f Badiouan actors.
In this Chapter I have briefly outlined Badiou’s basic understanding o f “being”
and some implications for what Badiou has named an “event.” I have argued for the
importance o f understanding an event as a “break” in a situation, as calling for a new
regime in thought and action within a situation. To fail in this is to lack fidelity to the
event itself, ultimately to the truth o f a situation and composition o f a subject. One
cannot simply go on living “as i f ’ an event never took place. Olympe de Gouges is an
excellent example o f a faithful subject o f a truth, one who fully lived the consequences o f
the statement “Men are bom and remain free and equal in rights” even when others
opposed the fundamental universality o f the designation “men” by failing to admit
women and Jewish citizens into the political process. I argued that this fidelity
constitutes an ethic, one that is able to recognize three distortions o f the Good:
simulacrum, betrayal, and forced naming. This ethic is manifested within political praxis,
whether it be subtractive Badiouan politics, or a Zizekian supplement. What emerges
from this discussion is a discourse on fidelity, a way o f talking about fidelity to a truth
that unfolds point by point in a world. Badiou challenges us to think about what it means
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to be a subject o f a truth, what constitutes this subject, and what is required o f her. In the
next Chapter, we turn to the philosophy o f Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek and the
implications he draws from Jesus’ crucifixion for death o f God theology and community,
both notions, in turn, informed by Zizek’s understanding o f Spirit.
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Chapter Two
Slavo) Zizek: A Crucified God
2.1 The Death of God
Christian universality is the universality which emerges at the symptomal point of those
who are "part of no-part" of the global order - this is where the reproach of exclusion gets
it wrong: the Christian universality, far from excluding some subjects, is formulated from
the position of those excluded, of those for whom there is no specific place within the
existing order, although they belong to it; universality is strictly co-dependent with this
lack of specific place/determination.1181920*
“The Parallax View II,” Slavoj
Zizek

It is clear that, like his atheist Marxist predecessor Ernst Bloch, Slavoj Zizek finds
the Jewish book o f Job to be fascinating.

Though Zizek follows G.K. Chesterton’s

interpretation, the interpretations o f Bloch and Zizek are complementary. Bloch, for
example, sees Job taking a step away from God, in “an ‘exodus from Jehovah,’ a step
toward freeing humanity.”

For him the most logical response to the theodicy presented

by Job’s situation is the French enlightenment’s dieu n ’existepas.

Zizek too feels that

the story o f Job involves an emancipatory kernel leading one to atheism, but he takes a
118 Slavoj Zizek, “Parallax View II: The Birth o f (the Hegelian) Concrete Universality
Out o f the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies,” Lacan.com (2006):
http://www.lacan.com/zizparallax2.htm (accessed March 25,2010).
119 Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity (London: Verso, 2009).
120 Hans-Robert Jauss, “Job's Questions and Their Distant Reply: Goethe, Nietzsche,
Heidegger” in Comparative Literature (Summer 1982), 202.
101

James Bentley, “The Christian Significance o f Atheist Ernst Bloch” in The Expository
Times (1976), 53.
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much more radical position, following Chesterton: it is God himself who becomes fo r a
moment an atheist. To see how he comes to this conclusion one must start with a brief
examination o f the story itself.
Job finds himself in a horrible state. He has lost his servants and the animals they
were tending (Job 1:15). His sheep were burned up by fire from heaven, along with the
servants who were tending them (1:16). The Chaldeans came and stole his camels, killing
once again the servants who were tending them with the edge o f the sword (1:17). His
children were then crushed under a roof that collapsed under high winds (1:18). Upon
hearing o f these tragedies Job, surprisingly, worships (1:20). As if this was not enough
tragedy, Job is also struck with a skin disease (2:7). It is only after this that Job’s three
friends come and present themselves before him. Zizek rightly points out that despite the
text’s own comments that “they made an appointment together to come show him
sympathy and comfort,” what they offered instead was interpretation:
[...] his theological friends come, offering interpretations which render these
calamities meaningful, and the greatness o f Job is not so much to protest his
innocence as to insist on the meaninglessness o f his calamities (when God appears
afterward, he sides with Job against the theological defenders o f the faith).12
V

That something more than a comforting interpretative gloss is called for, Zizek
makes the point that the story o f Job and the story o f Jesus are interconnected in the
biblical narrative and in Christian thought. Something momentous is thus afoot, as, in a
move o f double kenosis, there is implicit in both accounts an “overlapping of God’s self-12

122 Slavoj Zizek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity o f Christ: Paradox or Dialectic
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 53.
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alienation with the alienation o f the human individual abandoned by God.”

The first

symptom o f God’s self-alienation is wonder:
God says, in effect, that if there is one fine thing about the world, as far as men are
concerned, it is that it cannot be explained. He insists on the inexplicableness of
everything. “Hath the rain a father?... Out o f whose womb came the ice?” He
goes farther and insists on the positive and palpable unreason o f things; “Hast
thou sent the rain upon the desert where no man is, and upon the wilderness
wherein there is no man?” (38.26). To startle man, God becomes for a moment a
blasphemer; one might almost say that God becomes for an instant an atheist. He
unrolls before Job a long panorama o f created things, the horse, the eagle, the
raven, the wild ass, the peacock, the ostrich, the crocodile. He so describes each
o f them that it sounds like a monster walking around in the sun. The whole is a
sort o f psalm or rhapsody o f the sense o f wonder. The maker o f all things is
astonished at the things he has Himself made.123124
God, in the book o f Job, has taken one step away as the guarantor o f meaning in the face
o f catastrophe. For Zizek this very thing happens once again at the crucifixion. In Jesus’
cry, “Why have you forsaken me?” Christ’s address to the God-Father is a confrontation
concerning the meaninglessness o f it all. Here at the crucifixion there is also no guarantor
o f meaning (there is no response from heaven as at Christ’s baptism). Here in Jesus
crucified, rather, “man’s alienation from God coincides with God’s alienation from
himself.”125
When the world shook and the sun was wiped out o f heaven, it was not at the
crucifixion, but at the cry from the cross: the cry which confessed that God was
forsaken o f God. And now let the revolutionists choose a creed from all the
creeds and a god from all the gods o f the world, carefully weighing all the gods of
inevitable recurrence and o f unalterable power. They will not find another god

123 Ibid, 57.
124 G.K. Chesterton, The Book o f Job with an Introduction (London: C. Palmer and
Hayward, 1916), xxiii.
125 Zizek and Milbank, 60.
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who himself has been in revolt. Nay (the matter grows too difficult for human
speech), but let the atheists themselves choose a god. They will find only one
divinity who ever uttered their isolation; only one religion in which God seemed
for an instant to be an atheist.126

For Zizek, this is a radical departure from standard forms o f atheism in which God ceases
to exist for the one who no longer believes in God. In Christianity, God dies for
Himself.127
This, then, would be the outlines o f the Zizekian response to my earlier statement
that the disciples were acting more consistently in regard to Christ’s teachings than Christ
himself: O f course the disciples would act this way, by definition, they are still acting as
followers without autonomy. Only Christ him self as the incarnation o f God has the
autonomy to act how he pleases, even i f his actions are not consistent with his teaching.
V

Zizek is right here to recognize this as a consequence o f the incarnation:
Back to great Teachers like the Buddha: they did not reveal their Truth in the
strict Christian sense; they merely exemplified by their model life the universal
teaching they were spreading. In this precise sense, the Buddha was a Buddhist,
even an exemplary one, while Christ was not a Christian - he was Christ himself
in his absolute singularity. Christ does not “demonstrate with his acts his fidelity
to his own teaching” - there simply is no gap between his individuality and his
teaching, a gap to be filled in by the fidelity o f his acts to his teaching; Christ’s
ultimate “teaching” - lesson - immediately is his very existence as an individual

126 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2008), 135. Karl
Barth also attributes a kind o f “unbelief’ to Jesus’ cry from the cross: “In the peace of
God there is room also for what the world calls unbelief: My God, my God, why hast thou
forsaken me?” Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1968), 155.
Slavoj, Zizek, The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core o f Christianity
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 15.
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who is, in absolute simultaneity, man and God.

198

This absolute identification o f God and man should be recognized as the “monstrosity”
that it is, not simply in the two-fold sense Zizek envisions in his Monstrosity o f Christ —
first as the monstrosity o f the infinite God in finite human flesh, secondly as the
monstrous notion that the human should “stand” for God

— but also in a third sense

drawn from Zizek’s own oeuvre in another place: the monstrosity o f the human subject
itself.

Here Christ becomes a monstrosity by association, for by becoming human he

too must endure the gaze o f the animal who sees in the human an alien creature, a horrible
perversion o f nature, capable not only o f destroying the environment on which it depends,
but even destroying itself and every living thing. This is the (self) alienation experienced
by God in man, reaching its ultimate expression in the words o f forsakenness from the
cross. The process inaugurated in the book o f Job as a self-wondering God is thus
completed in the gospels in the account o f a self-sacrificing God, a God who finds
himself forsaken not just by created beings, but by the now empty heavens themselves.
V

This is why Zizek, a propos o f Christian universalism, maintains that the usual
form o f universalism does not go far enough in recognizing Jesus’ own place among the
excluded:
To follow Saint Paul... Christian universality, far from excluding some subjects, is
form ulatedfrom the position o f those excluded, o f those for whom there is no128930

128 Zizek, Parallax View, 98.
129 Zizek and Milbank, 74.
130 God Without the Sacred, Zizek, Lecture NYPL. Available online from
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQP31DdbP4A.
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specific place within the existing order, although they belong to it.131*
Is not the Biblical example o f this excluded position par excellence, indeed, Jesus
himself, and specifically the Jesus o f the cross?

1

V
For Zizek, the very character of

Christianity is such that it functions as a religion that prepares humanity for the “exit from
the religious,” precisely in its treatment o f the incarnation and death of the God-man
Jesus:133
With Christ’s incarnation; the extemalization/self-alienation o f divinity, the
passage from the transcendent God to finite/mortal individuals, is fa it accompli,
there is no way back, all there is, all that “really exists,” from now on are
individuals.134
The point is not simply that Jesus was mortal, but rather, that Jesus “had no specific
place,” nowhere to “lay his head,” and was finally excluded from life itself. Not only
does God remove himself from the situation, but his final act in Jesus is to completely
identify himself with those who are a “part o f no-part,” those who are, for Zizek,

131 Zizek, Parallax View, 35.
110

Interestingly, this conclusion flies in the face o f a Badiouan position regarding Christ,
which as we have seen locates Christ’s importance not in his life and death (which are
ultimately non-Events) but in the resurrection (and the subsequent fidelities to its
implications). The couplet, Badiou: Resurrection/ Zizek: Death, reflects the two general
subjective orientations o f the thinkers in their respective Idealism and Pessimism. In our
present context, a combination o f the two would seem to fit nicely with the statement,
“No Resurrection Sunday without Holy Friday.”
133 Thierry de Duve, “Come on Humans, One More Effort if You Want to be PostChristian” in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, eds, Political Theologies: Public
Religions, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), 652.
134 Zizek and Milbank, 61.

61

exemplified by the world’s burgeoning slum inhabitants,
828 million inhabitants and climbing.

1

which UN estimates place at

The person o f Jesus is universal here precisely

because o f his detachment from those institutions and guarantees o f social status, without
any particular identity within a recognized social order. In his identification with the part
of no-part, Jesus in a sense foretold his own universality, not in the sense o f a particular
human rising from the dead thereby representing the promise for all of resurrection, but in
the sense o f his standing for the poor, that part o f society which is “out of place” with the
1

nn

social totality and therefore de-particularized.
If we were to stop here, this view could perhaps be criticised for making a virtue
out o f poverty, as if poverty as-such had universal value or positive meaning. It is not
that the part o f no-part is inherently virtue-laden, as many charitable organizations seem
to portray.

What concerns us here, by contrast, is the part o f no-part as a site of

emancipatory activity, or in Badiouan terms, a site out o f which a Subject arises. What
makes the apostles subjects, on such terms, is their fidelity to the Christ-event, a fidelity
that simultaneously separated them from their former status as indiscernible. Their135*7

135 Zizek, End Times, 124.
1

Global Action Needed to Tackle Urban Squalor as Number o f Slum-dwellers
Continues Rising Worldwide, Second Committee Told.Online, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gaef3294.doc.htm, accessed December 2010.
137 Zizek, End Times, 124.
118

A favourite is the face o f an African woman who is poverty-stricken and has
contracted HIV. As Kylie Thomas rightly notes: “To take such representations as points
o f access to the truth o f the subjects they represent is to disavow the relations o f power
that continue to determine how such images appear and how they can be read.” Thomas,
“Selling sorrow: testimony, representation and images o f HIV-positive South African
women,” Social Dynamics (Sept 2008) 223.
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humble beginning was the presupposition o f their later subjectivization, the ground from
which their subjectivity was made possible — not as a guarantee o f that subjectivity, but a
site in which that subjectivity became possible. For Zizek such subjectivity is composed
not just o f an individual’s fidelity, but by the fidelity o f a community o f the faithful,
which he speaks o f as the community o f the Spirit.
That this Spirit community exists depends, however, on the death o f God. Or, as
Zizek puts it: “There is no Holy Spirit without the squashed body o f a bird (Christ’s
mutilated corpse).” 139 What does Zizek mean by this? Again, we will have to consider
the incarnation and death o f God in Christ, but understood in quasi-Hegelian terms. What
happens in the incarnation, for Zizek, is correlative to the phenomenological140 move
observable in the development o f philosophy between Kant and Hegel. This is a difficult
and no doubt controversial point, and we have scope here only to touch upon it lightly,
but simply put, pre-incamational thinking about God may be represented as thoroughly
Kantian, in that God can be seen as the “Thing-in-itself ’ which cannot be
“phenomenalized” properly, and thus cannot be fully represented. It is only the
incarnation that moves from the unphenomenizable “Thing” to something that has full
presence in bone and flesh. This is quite a radical thought. The gap between the “thingas-such” and one’s representations, either filtered through a person’s nervous system and
sensory apparatuses, or represented through the medium o f language and culture, is a
given limit o f the human ability to know and see. It is a presupposition o f all worlds of
appearing, the ground o f all phenomenal things, but impenetrable in and o f itself. This is
139 Zizek and Milbank, 76.
140 The word as used in this sense owes much to Hegel.
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why the incarnation is such a radical notion. For the first time in thought, the two are
brought into radical identification with one another: The “thing-in-itself ’ is now what
might be called a “thing-for-us.”141 Zizek writes:
The gap o f representation is thus closed, exactly as in the case o f Christ who, in
contrast to previous pagan divinities, does not “represent” some universal power
or principle (as in Hinduism, in which Krishna, Vishna [sic.], Shiva, and so on, all
“stand for” certain spiritual principles or powers - love, hatred, reason): as this
miserable human, Christ directly is God. Christ is not also human, apart from
being God; he is a man precisely insofar as he is God; that is, the ecce homo is the
highest mark o f his divinity. There is thus an objective irony in Pontius Pilate’s
“Ecce h o m o r, when he presents Christ to the enraged mob: its meaning is not
“Look at this miserable tortured creature! Do you see in it a simple vulnerable
man? Have you no compassion for it?” but, rather, “Here is God himself!” 142
For Zizek, then, the death o f the God-man Jesus is in effect the death o f the “thing-initself.” There is no longer an infinite “beyond,” beyond appearance. The very obscurity
o f the “thing-in-itself’ is a sign that there is nothing beyond the world o f phenomenality.
It is now only in the world o f appearances, in subjective experience that the Thing can be
encountered. Christ’s incarnation and death was necessary so that God would no longer
remain a distant self-contained entity.
The incarnation, furthermore, was the necessary condition o f Christian
subjectivity, o f Spirit’s identification with human activity. This community of the Spirit
fills in the gap, the void, o f where God once dwelt. It “stands” in for God.

1411 am not sure if this expression has ever been used before. A cursory search has failed
to come up with a similar usage. This is not an expression Zizek himself uses.
142 Zizek, Parallax View, 105-106.
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2.2 Spirit/Collective
For Zizek the next move follows from the crucifixion: the Spirit is now “the
virtual presupposition o f the activity o f finite individuals.”143 Against those who think the
Hegelian “Spirit” is a kind of meta-spirit substance existing in some way apart from
human subjects, controlling human history, Zizek maintains a typically “young Hegelian”
approach, and cites Hegel’s own famous words to this effect:
[...] it is in the finite consciousness that the process of knowing spirit’s essence
takes place and that the divine self-consciousness thus arises. Out of the foaming
ferment o f finitude, spirit rises up fragrantly.144145
Finite human beings are, in short, the site o f the Spirit which, as Hegel himself says, can
only be experienced sensually:
Since it is, on the one hand, a need, a feeling, the subject must, on the other hand,
distinguish itself from it, must make a distinction between this presence o f God
and itself, but in such a way that this presence o f God will be something certain,
and this certainty can actually exist here only in the form o f sensuous
manifestation.14
But ¿izek goes a step further. It has been fashionable in some parts of the Church
to emphasize the inner experience o f Christ over against the institutional framework or
external ordering o f the church body, a practice that no doubt often leads to a kind of

143 Ibid.
144 G. W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion: The Consummate Religion,
trans. Peter C. Hodgson (Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1998), 233.
145 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion (London: Paternoster House,
1895), 88. Hodgeson translates it “sensible appearance.” See Hodgson, 464.
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“spiritual elitism” among Christians (a problem also in St. Paul’s Corinth).146 What, asks
Zizek, if the Holy Spirit is itself pure performativity? What if it is that meaning
independent o f one’s actual words, located purely within the act?147 is the Spirit would
then be something similar to the social gesture o f saying “Gesundheif ’ after your friend
sneezes, or even after a perfect stranger sneezes. It is not so much the words themselves
that are important, for one could just as easily say “God bless you” (often even to an
atheist!), or “a tes souhaits” after a sneeze, depending on the linguistic context. The
point, rather, is the performative function o f the response within the social field. In the
same way, the Holy Spirit on such terms could be seen not so much as a “person”
subsisting within the divine substance, but as an act, an act which is in the specifically
Christian case, the actual activity o f the Christian community.
Such is, o f course, Zizek’s view o f the Spirit, and that is why, for Zizek, those
early Christians who awaited Christ’s return soon drew the inevitable and proper
conclusion: they were waiting for the wrong thing. The originally apocalyptic collective
soon self-organized with the understanding that “Christ had already returned as the Holy

146 See for example, Ronald M. Enroth, Churches that Abuse (Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1992). “Quite clearly, the excesses at Community Chapel demonstrate
what can happen when spiritual experience dictates theology and then necessitates a re
interpretation o f Scripture. Subjective experience takes care o f the theological loopholes
that the Bible seems not to address. The leadership o f Community Chapel promoted the
view that one could accept certain doctrines and practices if they could not be disproved
from Scripture... [I]t has been said that commitment without careful reflection is
fanaticism in action, and that certainly was the case at Community Chapel” (26). See also
1 Corinthians 14 where Paul repeatedly emphasizes the importance of “order” in worship,
a plea propped up by reminder to the Corinthian church o f his apostolic leadership.
147 Zizek, Parallax View, 117.

Spirit o f their community.” 148 For Zizek, then, the Holy Spirit is the activity o/the
apocalyptic emancipatory collective. Through the actions o f the community the Holy
Spirit is manifested in its members.
What dies with Jesus on the cross, therefore, is the hope that there is a “Father”
who is there to hear the cry, “Father, why have you forsaken me?” The new community
o f the Spirit that follows from his death cannot rely on any such notion o f a big Other, a
Master-Signifier. But the implication o f this extends well beyond the sphere of the
Church itself:
The point o f Christianity as the religion o f atheism is not the vulgar humanist one
that the becoming-man-of-God reveals that man is the secret of God (Feuerbach et
al.); rather, it attacks the religious hard core that survives even in humanism, even
up to Stalinism, with its belief in History as the “big Other” that decides on the
“objective meaning” of our deeds.149150

All such Others are dead. Here, then, in the Spirit community one may locate a fourth
monstrosity, not just the scandal o f a God-man, the idea that in some way a man could
stand for God, or that man the destroyer and perversion o f nature should be the site o f the
incarnation, but now also the notion that each individual has an immediate access to
universality (the Holy Spirit), regardless o f social standing or gender}50
Like Badiou, Zizek sees St. Paul as providing the real formulation for this
universalization: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there

148 Zizek and Milbank, 283.
149 Zizek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 171.
150 Zizek, End Times, 105.
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male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28).151 No longer is one’s
status determined by biological considerations, so that against established practice, and
even Aristotle, there is no longer such a thing as a slave by nature. St. Paul demonstrates
this conviction in a diplomatic fashion in regard to Onesimus, Philemon’s runaway
Sovloq, who in his fidelity to Christ should no longer be considered a slave but an
aSsl<p6q. Zizek is correct to recognize in Jesus’ logion, “If anyone comes to me and does
not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters—yes, even their own
life— such a person cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26), the prototype of this Pauline
universalism. Fidelity to the Christ-event trumps all natural relations, cutting across all
identities grounded in biological-cultural designations. According to Zizek:
“Holy Spirit” designates a new collective held together not by a Master-Signifier,
but by fidelity to a Cause, by the effort to draw a new line o f separation that runs
“beyond Good and Evil,” that is to say, that runs across and suspends the
distinctions o f the existing social body.152
As Thierry de Duve pointed out (see note 133), Christianity prepares the way out
o f the religious for the first time in the history o f religions. Zizek believes it is possible

151 Although this is not unproblematic. See, for example Alain de Benoist’s criticism of
John Milbank, equally applicable here: “Let us note Milbank’s extravagant assertion that
the “equality o f women . . . stems from St. Paul.” Has Milbank really read the first Epistle
to the Corinthians: “The wife doesn’t have authority over her own body, but the husband”
(1 Cor. 7:4); “The head o f the woman is the man” (1 Cor. 11:3); “For neither was man
created for the woman, but woman for the man” (1 Cor. 11:10-11)? Or the Epistle to the
Ephesians: “For the husband is the head o f the wife, and Christ also is the head of the
assembly” (Eph. 5:23). And in the First Epistle to Timothy: “Let the woman learn in
silence in all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the
man, but to be in silence” (1 Tim. 2:11-12).” Alain de Benoist, “Reply to Milbank,”
Telos, (Summer 2006) 25.
152 Zizek, Puppet and the Dwarf, 130.
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today to redeem this core o f the Christian tradition, but it will come at a cost. It must
abandon:
[...] the shell o f its institutional organization. The gap here is irreducible: either
one drops the religious form, or one maintains the form, but loses the essence.
That is the ultimate heroic gesture that awaits Christianity: it order to save its
treasure, it hasI to
sacrifice itself- like Christ, who had to die so that Christianity
M
could emerge.
In the appropriation o f Spirit as the locus o f its activity (an activity belonging uniquely to
it), the Church committed a great crime against Jesus and humanity. It committed what
Thomas Altizer calls the original heresy: the identification o f the Church as the body of
Christ.153154 It is only by sacrificing itself as its founding figure did that Christianity will
V

truly be living out the kenotic movement o f God’s will. It is this Christianity that Zizek
sees following in the long history of the emancipatory Idea (beginning with Spartacus, a
favourite o f leftists like Zizek155156).
One is left wondering at this juncture whether Zizek is offering anything other
than a “death o f God” theology akin to those o f the 1960s? In fact, none other than
Thomas Altizer, one o f the leaders o f the death o f God movement a generation ago, is one
v

o f two people to endorse Zizek’s work The Monstrosity o f Christ on the rear cover.

1r z

In

153 Ibid, 171.
154 Thomas Altizer, The Gospel o f Christian Atheism (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1966), 132.
155 See M arx’s “Confession” where Spartacus is described as his hero, along with
Keppler. Badiou too treats Spartacus in his Logics o f Worlds, 69.
156 “The contemporary return to the theological most dramatically occurs in this book, as
Zizek fully realizes his earlier Hegelian and Lacanian theological work, a work that
Milbank can essentially know as a unique modem expression of nihilism. Nonetheless,
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one o f the few places Zizek references Altizer, his relationship to Altizer’s ideas is clear:
“The only way to redeem the subversive core o f Christianity is therefore to return to
death-of-God theology, especially Thomas Altizer: to repeat its gesture today.”157 What
Zizek hopes to do, however, goes beyond Altizer in that he aims specifically to recapture
the very traumatic core o f Christian apocalypticism, the death o f God as the “darkness at
noon,” the apocalypse o f God.158
The death o f God debate is, as has been suggested, an old one, and Altizer is
certainly among the best known o f the theologians to elaborate on a death o f God
theology in recent memory. His work, however, is currently regaining some of the
popularity it once had and is being engaged by a number of diverse thinkers (Zizek is a
case in point).159 Altizer and Zizek share a very similar understanding of the implications
o f the idea o f God’s kenotic nature in Christian theology, but where Altizer is left
V

wrestling with the significance o f God’s continual self-emptying, Zizek busily outlines a
post-Christian collective where the locus o f the Spirit is the new universal community. At
this point, the importance o f Badiou for Zizek comes into particular focus, for the Spirit
(for Zizek the meaning o f the “resurrected God”) is literally the collective’s fidelity to the
event.

Milbank enters into a genuine theological dialogue with this nihilism, and a truly new
theological discourse occurs. This effects a paradoxical union between orthodoxy and
heterodoxy, which is perhaps the deepest m otif o f the contemporary return to the
theological.” The other reviewer is Catherine Malabou.
157 Zizek and Milbank, 260.
158 Ibid, 260-261.
159 Christopher Rodkey, “Thinking Through the Death o f God” in Journal fo r Cultural
and Religious Theory (Fall 2005), 109-115.

The possibilities inherent in this community are really Zizek’s main focus. In a
move paralleling the early Christian emergence in the context o f imperial Rome, this
community functions to “undermine the global empire o f capital, not by asserting
particular identities, but through the assertion o f a new universality.”160 How this process
actually plays out seems to take on a Qohelet161 style ethic. There is a time for violent
resistance and a time for non-violent positivity, a time for quiet subversive activity and a
time for open railing against the enemy. Here one should counter Zizek and Johnston’s
earlier critique o f Badiou’s “quietism” with Zizek’s own understanding o f the nature of
violence. Zizek points out the properly “violent” nature o f refusing to act within a given
political context, a kind of “Bartleby politics”, named after Melville’s character in his
classic, Bartleby the Scrivener, who after being asked by his employer to perform some
duty would either remain silent or respond with the sentiment, “I would prefer not to,”
completely disorienting his employer. According to Zizek:
The “Bartleby act” is violent precisely insofar as it entails refusing this obsessive
activity - in it, not only do violence and non-violence overlap (non-violence
appears as the highest violence), so too do act and inactivity (here the most radical
act is to do nothing).162

Here too, it might be possible to understand Zizek’s approach as, at times at least, similar
to Badiou’s refusal to engage in state politics, in order to do more violence by inactivity
and withdrawal than by activist commitment, so that by “preferring not to” participate,

160 Slavoj Zizek, “A Leftist Plea for Eurocentrism” in Critical Inquiry (Summer 1998),
1008.
161 The Hebrew name for the biblical book more usually called Ecclesiastes.
162 Zizek, End Times, 401.
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the state apparatus and its mechanisms are undermined at the level o f their very
presupposition, i.e. in their assumed democratic justification.
V

John Milbank has referred to Z iiek’s theology as a “heterodox version of
Christian belief.”

To be sure, Zizek is not interested in engaging a philosophy or

theology that has not been informed by the Enlightenment or modem science.163164 In fact,
Zizek does not hesitate to integrate the findings o f modem science, quantum physics for
example, into his philosophic-theological construction o f reality.16516 There is something
powerful about a position that is willing to go all the way, allowing various fields of
human learning to inform its content, somewhat reminiscent o f E.O. Wilson’s project of
“Ionian Enchantment” in Consilience}66 Nevertheless, here is a theology which takes as
its basic premise that its Object is dead. More accurately, it takes for granted that the
Master-Signifier o f traditional theology is empty. For Zizek, there never was a “God”
behind the curtain o f reality, there was only ever the sign embedded in the presentation o f
reality itself.
This is certainly a heterodox position, but it falls within and engages that stream
o f theology which is interested in how the early Church interpreted Jesus, and so, is part
163 Zizek and Milbank, 111.
164 With the exception o f Meister Eckhart. But it is Eckhart’s apophatic theology which
lends itself well to philosophical appropriation. Hegel, who has a considerable influence
on Zizek’s thinking, uses language strikingly similar to Eckhart. That Hegel read and was
influenced by Eckhart is well known. See Glen Alexander Magee, Hegel and the
Hermetic Tradition (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 24-26.
165 Slavoj Zizek, “Towards a Materialist Theology” in Angelaki: Journal o f Theoretical
Humanities (April 2007); 19-26. For more on science see page 77ff, and note 103.
166 E.O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity o f Knowledge (New York: Vintage Books,
1999).
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o f the legitimate wrestling with the significance o f Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion.
Admittedly Zizek does not see himself as correcting a theological error per se. He is
more interested in how the truth o f the Christ-event might be (re) deployed for the
“articulation o f universality as founded on the exceptional event,”

a concept which is,

as we have seen, another materialist appropriation o f the theological vis-à-vis Badiou.
This allows him to rest relatively outside o f orthodox critique. But might one not
challenge the atheist Zizek himself as a theologian in the death o f God stream? This may
be overstating the case, but Zizek’s engagement o f Christian theological language and
thought occasionally seems to reveal surprising sympathies as well as contradictions in
the thought o f the “big man from Slovenia.” For example, in his In Defense o f Lost
Causes, Zizek speaks about the coinage needed to accept the idea that the “big Other” no
longer exists: “The true courage o f an act is always the courage to accept the inexistence
o f the big Other, that is, to attack the existing order at the point o f its symptomal knot.”167168
Does this not, however, legitimate the very thing it seeks to renounce? If one truly
accepts the nonexistence o f the big Other it is a matter o f indifference, not courage. In
addition, if the big Other in the case of Christianity was only ever a sign imbedded in
worldly presentation, what one needs is re-education, not bravery. If on the other hand
we believe in the existence o f a big Other, it would take courage to deny it, by very virtue
o f our belief in it. One wonders what it is that Zizek feels he must overcome here?

167 Ward Blanton, “Apocalyptic Materiality: Retum(s) of Early Christian Motifs in Slavoj
Zizek’s Depiction o f the Materialist Subject” in Journal fo r Cultural and Religious
Theory (December 2004), 10.
168 Zizek, Defense o f Lost Causes, 152.

73

In this Chapter, then, we have seen that for Zizek God must first die in order for
humans to have true autonomy and responsibility for their life situation. He finds in the
Christian story o f the crucified Christ a valuable resource, one in which God does indeed
die on a cross, resulting in the resurrection o f an idea: the Spirit, the emancipatory activity
o f the faithful collective. The limits of this position from a Christian perspective ought
not to blind us to its potential constructive importance. One aspect o f this I wish to
develop is in relation to the question with which we began, the re-invigoration o f the
Church. In the final Chapter, I will argue that not only do Zizek and Badiou deal with
Christian themes more effectively than their materialist counterparts, but also that their
emphasis on the “this-worldly” implications o f theology results in powerful motivators
for political and ethical praxis, so that point by point within the world a truth must be
faithfully addressed by a subject and a faithful body.
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Chapter Three
Towards a Pointai Ecclesiology

"Yessir, I am! I'm retiring from the world. I'm going to become an ascetic. That's what.
There is no love left in this world my friend. No love left. They have even made pills out
of Jesus, they have. And you know something? I don't give a damn anymore. Not a pinch
of shit. Up with libido power! If God doesn't want to wipe us out we are going to wipe out
God. Serves Him right too, all this peek-a-boo-stuff is a fraud. I guess He can't do
anything about it anymore than I can. So I'm cutting out. Everybody for himself I
think." Claudio Ianora, BoobielandExpress

3.1 Materialists and Subversives
It should now be clear that both Zizek and Badiou offer important insights into the
nature o f community and fidelity. Zizek engages with Christian theology and in
particular elaborates on a Christology that leads him to the extreme theological
conclusion o f a death o f God theology where God truly is dead, having committed
suicide, or more appropriately “deicide.” On the one hand, this may be seen as following
in a one-sided way a certain logic inherent in the New Testament writings and early
Church itself (Paul’s kenotic Christ and the Church’s identification o f Jesus with Deity,
for example). On the other side, however, the lengths to which Zizek goes, actually
emptying out the heavens and declaring that God is no more, or that the resurrection
should be understood not in terms o f Jesus bodily coming forth from the grave but in
terms o f community Spirit, with no promise o f a future resurrection o f believers and
eternal life in its traditional Christian sense, is simply too much for most theologians.
While disagreement between theologians is commonplace, the existence o f God and the
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historical reality o f the resurrection have traditionally been fundamental tenets of
Christian faith.169 Thus, simply appropriating Badiou or Zizek’s work is not
unproblematic.170
As we move through this Chapter we will slowly outline some key concepts
towards a pointal ecclesiology. It will be shown that any ecclesiology drawing on Badiou
and Zizek will be communal. Against the rampant individualism in our society, a pointal
ecclesiology will highlight the transformative and ethical force a community can bring to
bear in a situation or world. It will locate “truth” in a number o f places, not just the
private property o f a select few. It will emphasize fidelity to these truths, without losing
sight o f the truth in its own principles. It will further circumscribe one’s fidelity within
the spheres o f political praxis and experimentation. While direct appropriations of these
two philosophers’ work might be problematic for theology, it will be shown that there are
still valuable resources to be drawn from Zizek and Badiou, and that in the end, their
engagement with Christianity indicates a willingness on their own part to move beyond
facile dismissals to a considered interaction with theological thought.

169 There are always exceptions o f course, but these do not lie within generally accepted
tradition. For example, Rudolph Bultmann, who I refer to as a “Resurrection reactionary”
(page 75) denied historical status to the Resurrection, interpreting it instead within the
horizon o f the Church’s kerygmatic discourse and faith. “The real Easter faith is faith in
the word o f preaching which brings illumination. If the event o f Easter Day is in any
sense an historical event additional to the event o f the cross, it is nothing else than the
risen o f faith in the risen Lord, since it was this faith which led to the apostolic preaching.
The resurrection itself is not an event of past history.” Rudolph Bultmann, Kerygma and
Myth: A Theological Debate (London: SPCK, 1971), 42.
170 See more below on this, page 84.
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As we have seen, at various points Badiou and Zizek demonstrate an atheist “turn
to the religious,” drawing on sources o f religious history and thought to demonstrate and
even revive thinking about universality and the collective, both ethico-political
endeavours. This is in remarkable contrast to the agendas o f critics like Christopher
Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett, collectively known as the
“Four Horsemen.”

Whereas the “Horsemen” would prefer to extinguish religion

altogether, however, and replace it with a kind o f scientific humanism dedicated to the
god Reason, thinkers like Badiou and Zizek are much more subversive, appropriating the
very language and symbol o f religion, reinterpreting it from within, working with a
Reason inherent in its traditions.
The tension between the two critical approaches, as such, is instructive. In
response to the first, Hans Albert has said:
Since the middle o f our century, in philosophy and in some of the sciences, there
has been a growing tendency toward a kind o f antirealism, inspired by the
philosophies o f Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. More than in
previous times, philosophers take pains to undermine realism and the idea of
objective truth and to rehabilitate mythical thinking. To say it with Wittgenstein,
the religious language game cannot be affected by the results o f the sciences,
which are language games incommensurable with religion.171172
This, o f course, is a position completely at variance with the one held by the “Horsemen,”
which is, after all, that there is only one sort o f reason, and which therefore resists the
very possibility o f which Albert speaks. Here one should recognize just how subversive

171 A designation created in reference to a discussion with the four men present. See the
entry and relevant link at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Atheism.
177

Hans Albert, Between Social Science, Religion, and Politics: Essays in Critical
Rationalism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), 61.

Badiou and Zizek’s approach has been. Have they not approached religion from the
standpoint (broadly speaking) o f the Wittgensteinian “language game,” in order to
undermine it internally, but in so doing, supporting a more scientific (materialist) position
regarding the Spirit and universalism, hatched out o f the religious language game
itself?173 On the second point concerning Christian reason, who can deny the systems o f
fundamentally rational structures in Christian theology, inherited no doubt in large
measure from the Greeks and Romans, reinvigorated during the Middle Ages with the
rediscovery o f Aristotle’s writings, and finally reinforced by Enlightenment thinkers who
were themselves more often than not believers?
The difference between Badiou and Zizek (especially Badiou) and most
theologians is a disagreement not only over the real status o f the resurrection, but over the
existence o f God. It is here that we should return to our earlier discussion concerning
Badiou. In Chapter One, I suggested that a sixth response to Badiou was to accept his
ontology but to seek to supplement his atheism with a materialist theology - a Christian
atheism. This was necessary because Badiou’s ontology does not account for a divine
Subject; in the words o f the physicist Laplace, Badiou has “no need o f that hypothesis.”
For Badiou, as we have seen, the “event” to which St. Paul was faithful was not o f the
order o f a truth event, but a fable:
1

This is also, no doubt, why many missionaries feel Bible translation is so necessary:
the power o f reading or hearing a message in one’s own language is obvious to anyone
who has tried to communicate some important point in another language. Or perhaps in a
more paranoid frame one might see Badiou and Zizek’s work as an example o f Robert
Greene’s “Inner Front” strategy (itself borrowed from the Chinese 36 Strategies): “To
take something you want, do not fight those who have it, but rather join them - then
either slowly make it your own or wait for the moment to stage a coup d’état. No
structure can stand for long when it rots from within.” See Robert Greene, The 33
Strategies o f War (New York: Viking Press, 2006), 407.
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The Resurrection, after all, is just a mythological assertion. The claim “there is a
limitless succession o f prime numbers” expresses an indubitable universality. The
claim that “Christ is resurrected” is as though subtracted from the opposition
between the universal and the particular, because it is a narrative statement that we
cannot assume to be historical.174*
But the question remains: How does Zizek’s materialist theology provide room for a
“divine Subject?” Is it not still an “atheistic theology” with no place for God? The
answer is both yes and no. Whereas Badiou views all talk o f God within a mythical
framework, Zizek truly leaves the question open. For him, God is dead. All that matters
7

I <C

now is the Spirit o f the collective.

On a broader level, Zizek’s and Badiou’s engagement o f theological material
raises another question. What is the status o f theological thought? Who “owns” it, i.e.
who has the right to engage in and utilize it? Is it the special possession of faith
traditions, somewhat like the specialist knowledge and apparatuses o f various scientific
disciplines, or can non-faith participants legitimately do theology? To put this another
way, does it have the same status as communist egalitarianism, as pointed out by Rancière
in connection with failed communist communities:
They did not fail, as the opinion goes, because individuals could not submit to the
common discipline. On the contrary, they failed because the communist capacity
could not be privatized. The sharing o f the capacity o f anybody could not be

174 Badiou, Saint Paul, 107.
17?
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For Zizek, the big Other designated “God” was once thought of in terms of divine
subjectivity, but now post-crucifixion should be thought only in terms o f activity, here
inextricable from human praxis. “God” as a noun is a mystification and deeply
misleading. Not only does it justify all kinds o f injustices for the sake o f serving or
impressing this big Other, it actually justifies inactivity, shirking responsibility for the
woes o f society, leading us to believe that somehow or other things will be all right
because Divine agency guarantees it.
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turned into the virtue o f the private communist man.

1

Ranciere’s point is that so many categories o f communist discipline, whether it be
emancipation from oppression or the communal sharing o f labour, do not belong to the
particular predicate “communism” as if only a communist could properly assume their
practice. They belong precisely to the “capacity o f anybody” by virtue o f their
universality, and therefore cannot be privatized or held pretentiously as particular
communist virtues.
Insofar as egalitarianism, ethics, and the event (in the sense o f creative novelty)
are concerned, can the Church not admit that in the past it has likewise “privatized the
capacity o f anybody,” has made these categories virtues o f the religious community as if
without the Church everyone would only do “what was right in his/her own eyes,” as if
there could be no new subjective creation without faith in Christ? Such a suggestion can
only be said to be preposterous in view o f the empirical evidence. It was Alan Watts, that
once Anglican minister turned Zen Buddhist, who summed up the state o f homily during
his time in the Church: “So much preaching we hear on Sunday morning comes down to
this: ‘My dear people, be good!’” So much should be admitted. The real problem,
however, is that such actual homiletic practice is a reflection of an underlying theology
that has become little more than the repetition o f the everyday humanistic parlance of
modernity. Obsessed with seeming relevant, much contemporary theology is found in the
position o f having given up on the deeper core o f Christian thought, in, for instance, the
historical status and meaning o f the resurrection (what Badiou refers to as a ‘Tabulation”).176
176 Jacques Rancière, “Communists Without Communism?” in The Idea o f Communism
(New York: Verso, 2010), 169.
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Nor is the problem merely implicit or subterranean in the life o f the Church, for the
Church itself has its own resurrection “reactionaries” with positions openly akin to
Badiou’s. For them, the resurrection is not theologically meaningful as an historical
event, but as for Badiou, merely provides a hermeneutical substrate for what is truly
important: theory and practice regarding the human subject/community. This sort of
theology is so obviously a compromise with modernity that it is difficult to take it
seriously as theology. It would surely cause the one who said,

. .if Christ has not been

raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain,” to roll over in his grave (1
Cor. 15:14). Perhaps it is best seen as a reflection o f the consciousness o f a certain
cultural type, or - because our dialogue concerns two Marxists - a certain “class.” As a
result o f the life o f relative comfort lived by this class, it can no longer identify with the
words that follow those just quoted: “If in Christ we have hope in this life only, we are o f
all people most to be pitied” (v.15). In short, it reflects a decadent class theology.
One should not, however, make the mistake o f dismissing Badiou and Zizek as
philosophers o f decadence along with such contemporary theologians. For one thing,
they do not belong to a tradition in which the resurrection as an historical event is
debated, or one in which it is seen as the source o f hope both in this life and in the life o f
the world to come. In effect, they set themselves apart from all o f this by a reformulation
or inversion o f the Pauline principle: “We can have hope in Christ in this life only, so
le t’s get to workl” Whereas for St. Paul, human destitution seems only to be made
bearable by hope in a future resurrection, for Zizek and Badiou any talk o f bodily
resurrection or o f a hope beyond this life or this world is absurd. We are ultimately alone,
and therefore we must create the conditions by which evil is overcome. If one is to hope
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in anything, it is in one’s work, in the Idea that such a project is not only necessary, but
possible. The word “Christ” in the formulation, “We can have hope in Christ in this life
only,” would then have to be taken to mean something closer to “egalitarian love” for
these thinkers. Nor is all o f this sheer invention. Zizek, for instance, is fond o f quoting
Matthew 18:20: “For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I among
them.” This, for Zizek, is something akin to the idea that wherever there are workers
engaged in fighting for their cause, there lies the spirit o f those workers who have
sacrificed themselves for the revolutionary idea. There is in their struggle, and between
the workers, a common egalitarian love rising up out o f their very activity.

3.2 Experimentation
The problems in using philosophers such as Badiou and Zizek for theological
purposes have, o f course, to be acknowledged. However, there are also possibilities latent
in their thinking upon which much may be built. While no full discussion o f this question
is possible within the limits o f this thesis, I wish to draw in what follows on the concept
o f the event, in order to develop what I wish to call a “pointal” ecclesiology, in an attempt
to sketch the outlines o f an answer to the question with which this thesis began: “What
can be done to reinvigorate the Church in the West?”
We might begin by posing a pertinent question arising from the philosophy of
Badiou. Is it necessary, after all, to admit that today there is no proper Christian subject?
It would appear that this does not have to be the case for the simple reason that one can
certainly think of oneself as a Christian, and yet not deny the “evental” status of any
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worldly event, or fail to live in fidelity to it. Probing a little more deeply, we might
further ask what such fidelity might mean. For example, what has the Church had to say
about the prospect o f nuclear war, or how did it respond to the latest financial crisis?
How has it actualized its members to deal with these issues? Let us begin with modem
scientific developments. Has the Church, for instance, truly made an effort to come to
grips with quantum reality and evolutionary theory?

Has it “lived the consequences”

o f scientific progress, or has its failure to do so undermined its role in matters of greater
import than simply that o f moral teaching or reconciliation (vital in their own right)?

178

What has the Church had to say, for example, about the prospect o f nuclear war? The
truth o f the matter ought to make the theologian uncomfortable at this point. Ever since
the advent o f modem science the rational foundation for faith set up by the Fathers and
Scholastics and the whole “rational edifice” o f belief that followed has been, as Badiou
puts it, “mined:”1718179
[...] at the very moment in which science finally legislated upon nature via
demonstration, the Christian God could only remain at the centre of subjective
experience if it belonged to an entirely different logic, if the ‘proofs o f the
existence o f God’ were abandoned, and if the pure evental force o f faith were
177 Though one should not forget that Richard Feynman once famously quipped “I think I
can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics.” See also note 103.
178 Ironically does it not involve a reconciliation the Church itself had a hand in producing
a need for? Let us not forget its role in colonial oppression and the resulting political and
social unrest. See Bengt Sundkler and Christopher Steed, A History o f the Church in
Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Klaus Koschorke, Frieder
Ludwig, Mariano Delgado, and Roland Spliesgart eds., A History o f Christianity in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, 1450-1990: A Documentary Sourcebook (Cambridge:
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007). Though it should also be pointed out
that the story these accounts relate is highly complex, involving both a corrupting and a
reforming Church, a Church that is complicit in oppression, and a Church that
simultaneously opposes it.
179

Badiou (2007), 214.
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restituted. It would have been possible, indeed, to believe that with an advent o f a
mathematics o f infinity and a rational mechanics, the question imposed upon
Christians was that o f either renovating their proofs by nourishing them on the
expansion o f science; or, o f completely separating the genres, and establishing
that the religious sphere is beyond the reach of, or indifferent to, the deployment
o f scientific thought.180

Badiou continues, indirectly providing a searing critique o f that form o f Christian
apologetics which is all too willing to compromise with science and inadvertently leads to
“an abstract God, a sort o f ultra-mechanic, like Descartes’ God (‘useless and uncertain’)
which will become Voltaire’s clockmaker-God, and is entirely compatible with hatred of
Christianity.”181
Christian apologists like Alister McGrath and Arthur Peacocke often engage the
field o f scientific discovery in an effort to engage in dialogue and to affirm their theistic
position.182 The end result, however, often looks nothing like traditional Christian belief.
While some o f these models might satisfy scientifically informed people, they do not
necessarily lend support to the traditional or popular understanding o f God. They rather
provide, at most, a basic framework in which it is possible to say that some “Other” may
exist in some fashion. Biologist Richard Dawkins, perhaps one o f the most vocal atheists

180 Ibid. Pascal also recognized this dilemma: “Si on soumet tout à la raison notre religion
n'aura rien de mystérieux et de surnaturel. Si on choque les principes de la raison notre
religion sera absurde et ridicule” (If we submit everything to reason, our religion will no
longer be mysterious or supernatural. If we offend the principles o f reason, our religion
will be absurd and ridiculous]. (Pensées, 273).
181 Ibid.
1
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See for example: Alister E. McGrath, The Foundations o f Dialogue in Science &
Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998); Arthur Peacocke, Creation and the World
o f Science: The Re-Shaping o f B elief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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today, came to a very similar conclusion in a Time magazine debate (provocatively
named: “God vs. Science”) with geneticist Francis Collins, a Christian and former
director o f the Human Genome Research Institute: “If there is a God, it’s going to be a
whole lot bigger and a whole lot more incomprehensible than anything that any
theologian o f religion has ever proposed.”

This supports what Zizek says all along: the

New Atheists and Christian apologists are merely two sides o f the same coin. As Creston
Davis pointedly summarizes in the Introduction to Zizek and Milbank’s The Monstrosity
o f Christ: Paradox or Dialectic, in their arguments, both sides merely unfold the
implications o f the same premises. While on the surface they appear to be different, at a
deeper level they “share the exact same version o f that which underlies their very
thinking, viz. secular reason.”183184 A more radical departure for the field o f theology would
appear, therefore, to be needed.
The evental nature of science was clear to that great physicist and Nobel Peace
prize winner for his work in quantum electrodynamics, Richard Feynman. The transcript
o f a 1973 interview originally broadcast on Yorkshire Television in the U.K. is
illuminating:
[FJaraday described electricity by inventing a model (field lines). Maxwell
formulated the equations mathematically with some model in his head, and Dirac
got his answer by just writing and guessing an equation. Other people, like in
relativity, got their ideas by looking at the principles of symmetry - and
Heisenberg got his quantum mechanics by only thinking and talking about the
things he could measure. Now take all these ideas: Try to define things only in
terms o f what we can measure. Let's formulate the equation mathematically, or
let's guess the equation - all these things are tried all the time. All that stuff 183 David van Biema, “God vs. Science” in Time (13 November 2006), 39.
184 Zizek and Milbank, 8.
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when we are going against the problem, we do all that. It is very useful, but we all
know that. That is what we learn in physics classes - how to do that.
But the new problem is where we are stuck. We are stuck because all those
methods don't work. If any o f those methods would work, we would have gone
through them. So when we get stuck in a certain place, it is a place where history
will not repeat itself. And that even makes it more exciting. Because whatever
we are going to look at - the method, the trick, and the way it's going to look - it's
going to be very different from the way we have seen before, because we have
used all the methods from before. So therefore a thing like the history o f the idea
is an accident o f how things actually happen. And if I want to turn history around
to try to get a new way o f looking at it, it doesn't make any difference...I don’t
care; the only real test in physics is experiment, and history is fundamentally
irrelevant.185

That creative novelty in the sciences was a break in the fabric o f the situation, that his
only prescription was “experimentation,” and that his fundamental orientation was not
determined by “history,” all qualify Feynman as an evental character within the sciences.
Badiou, for his part, has always acknowledged the importance o f an experimental
commitment in relation to the question o f fidelity to an event.186 Like Feynman, Badiou
does not understand experimentation as mere repetition, but as that which opens up the
possibility o f something new:
For the process o f a truth to begin, something must happen. What there already is,
the situation o f knowledge as such, only gives us repetition. For a truth to affirm
its newness, there must be a supplement. This supplement is committed to chance.
It is unpredictable, uncalculable. It is beyond what is. I call it an event.187

185 Abridged transcript available at: http://calteches.library.caltech.edU/35/2/
PointofView.htm. For the full interview see http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PsgBtOVzHKI, 6:57-8:42.
1 JiA

For example: “A Truth is a concrete process that starts by an upheaval (an encounter, a
general revolt, a surprising new invention), and develops as fidelity to the novelty thus
experimented.” On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou, by Christopher Cox and Molly
Whalen, Cabinet Magazine Online, Issue 5, Winter 2001/02. Available online,
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/alain-badiou/articles/on-evil/.
187

Badiou, “The Ethic o f Truths: Construction and Potency,” Pli 12 (2001), 250.
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To illustrate the importance o f this idea, albeit in a somewhat unconventional way,
I wish to refer to the 2010 Hollywood blockbuster Inception, directed by Christropher
Nolan, which I believe captures the sense o f this “break in the situation” extremely well.
The movie concerns a group o f futuristic agents who are capable o f entering into the
dreams o f whomever they wish to extract information from. A contractor hires them not
only to extract information, but to plant false memory as well. This involves going
deeper into the target’s psyche than ever before, potentially causing even the most
experienced dream agent to lose himself in the dreams o f another, to confuse the virtual
reality o f the dream with the reality o f waking life. In order to prevent this from
happening, dream agents must carry a “totem,” an object whose exact behaviour and
characteristics only the carrier knows. This totem allows the agent to know whether or
not she is working within dreamlike virtual reality, or actually participating in the real
world. The main character carries a small spinning top which, when spun in virtual
reality, will continue to spin indefinitely, allowing the agent to realize that he is still
immersed in dreamtime.
The movie ends at the moment that the main character is finally reunited with his
estranged children. In the final scene, as he is running towards his children, the audience
sees the top as it continues to spin where he left it, and then the screen goes blank and we
do not find out whether it topples or not. Many reviewers o f the movie completely miss
the point, suggesting that the meaning o f the final scene is that it "keeps us guessing
whether we're dreaming or not.”188 From a Badiouan perspective, however, we might say

188 For example see Mike Bruno’s review where he says: “W hat’s more, Cobb didn’t even
wait around to see for himself if his totem would fall. He rushed off to be with the kids. It
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instead that the point is precisely that it no longer matters. The subjective truths conveyed
by the main character finally meeting his children subsumes all other concerns, and so
constitutes the “break” in the situation. This is the ultimate truth of the scene. The
spinning top represents the Whole o f the situation (the possibility o f Wakefulness or
Fantasy) which is abruptly cut off (cinematographically) because it no longer represents
the Real o f the situation (the - subjective - localization o f the truth of the power o f Love).
We could add that ultimately we too are indifferent to the top. Its being (and
representative function) cease to exist from the point o f view of the subject, and hence its
banishment from sight without further consideration. Whether the top stands or falls, it is
no longer considered a site o f truth for the subject.
In a similar way, in the life o f the Church, I wish to suggest, one must take
advantage o f the “gap” that a break in the situation creates. Here we need to recognize
the abundance o f experimental communities and patterns o f thought that exist, rising
repeatedly within the Church itself. The various theologies, Christian identities and new
communities, the almost endless array o f published material available, testifies to the
existence and centrality o f this experimentation in this story o f Christianity. There is no
doubt that the diversity that results is not always seen as experimentation, but more
pejoratively as evidence o f a kind o f schismatic disunity, or even as downright heretical.
Within a Badiouan paradigm, however, and from the point o f view o f a pointal
ecclesiology, such diversity is rather the reflection o f an exercise o ffidelity. This is an
important insight, and is one that I wish to defend.

was as if he didn’t care-” Entertainment Weekly, “'Inception': Let's talk about that
ending,” Summer Entertainment Guide, http://popwatch.ew.com/2010/07/17/
%E2%80%98inception-ending/ (accessed April 2, 2011). This is precisely the point!
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A pointal ecclesiology must, therefore, in addition to the egalitarian component
discussed earlier, include within its own self-definition the necessity of experimentation.
As we have seen, this experimentation must include engagement with science. What, for
example, are the implications o f evolution by natural selection for human self
understanding? What about one’s conception o f God’s creative act, including a scriptural
hermeneutic which sees this act literally unfolding in Genesis 1 and 2? This, however,
will only be a secondary consideration. The emphasis is not on critique (though there
must be a critical component), but on a new creation. In other words, the real question
becomes this: how, in faithfulness to the event, will I live from this day on? Will the
decisions I make and the things I build, my labour, reflect my fidelity? From a Zizekian
point o f view my actions are not even a reflection o f this fidelity, they are my fidelity.
Experimentation is fidelity, in short, insofar as it is the faithful subject’s response to the
event.
We are speaking fundamentally here o f a pointal or evental ethic, and the basic
assumption, drawing constructively on the work o f Badiou and Zizek, is that it is possible
for a Christian subject to be seized by the event, and to work out the implications of the
event through experimentation within a given world, point by point. So far, however, the
most important question still has not been answered: What is specifically “Christian”
about the “Christian subject?” By what right does one still maintain the predicate? Is it
merely a self-designation signifying personal interest? These are important questions
which can no longer be neglected.
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3.3 From “Christian” Subject to Collective
We have already seen that, for Badiou, it is unnecessary to include with the
subject a particular qualification. Is this simply an impasse that one inevitably meets
when developing a Badiouan theology? This must be admitted. As we have seen, it is
not possible to draw a one-to-one correspondence between Badiou’s work and theology,
not without contradicting in the end his treatment o f the development o f the subject - or,
on the Christian side, without compromise to Christian self-understanding in the broadest
sense. His work is, however, still full o f riches for the theologian, even though mining
them entails that we can seem to be ignoring his fundamental premises and distorting the
whole — or, to put the point more positively, even though employing them presupposes a
certain “baptism” o f the work o f an unwilling convert.
It must be admitted, for example, that simply transferring his notion o f “fidelity to
the event” into a Christian framework, so that this fidelity comes to signify increased
devotion to God, some new insight into the Creed, or some “practical” or “spiritual” re
examination o f one’s life in light of the world’s distractions, and so on, would represent a
profound perversion o f Badiou’s original conception. Fidelity to the event in Badiou is
emphatically not an expression o f any particular religious devotion, and it is not a
quickening o f a specifically Christian piety. For Badiou, rather, an event explodes all
particularities (even though it necessarily arises from them). It has universal implications
(defined without theological content), and a faithful subject is defined precisely within the
ambit o f this universality. Badiou’s philosophy is not simply a new hermeneutical tool
that we can place in the toolbox, ready to be pushed by those marketers of shiny new
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Christian self-help products that fill the shelves o f so many bookstores, sold to enable
people to keep their particular faith allegiances. Badiou proposes, rather, a fundamental
reorientation o f outlook and o f practice that changes everything.
How, then, can all this be thought within a theological framework? It can
certainly not happen without some experimentation o f our own, and that in a properly
Badiouan sense: experimentation leading to supplementation. Then, however, we need
to reckon with the implication that what results may stretch the limits of what was
formerly known, in all its vast signification, as something “Christian.” At this point, it
would be useful to refer to our earlier discussion concerning Badiou. In Chapter One, I
suggested a sixth possible response to Badiou, which was to accept his ontology, but to
supplement his atheism with a materialist theology, by which was meant Zizek’s
“Christian atheism.” It is now time to sketch the contours o f what this kind of
supplementation might involve for a “pointal” ecclesiology.
First, I think that there is indeed something valuable to glean from Zizek’s
understanding of the emancipatory collective. What Zizek challenges the Christian to
confront is nothing less than the actualization o f what we might call “Holy Spirit
community.” Perhaps it is even possible to go so far to claim that Zizek is primarily
writing pneumatologically, concerning himself with the sanctification of humanity
through the power o f the Holy Spirit. This may sound absurd in the face of Zizek’s
atheism, but it is not an absurdity, o f course, if one also appropriates Zizek’s meaning of
the term “Spirit.” Such an approach would also have other implications. It would entail,
for instance, a reinterpretation o f the idea that Badiou finds so difficult: “Christ is
resurrected.” This now might mean that, “Christ is resurrected (only) in the body of
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‘Christians,’ those people who faithfully live out the implications o f the Christ event, who
actualize Spirit through the work o f the emancipatory community.”
There is nothing here that contradicts Badiou’s theory o f the event, no narrative
fable that subtracts itself from the opposition between the universal and the particular.
The subject/Spirit is as concrete as the one that participated in the French Revolution or in
the movements represented by May ’68, and continues to live in fidelity to the event.
“Christian” designates merely the particular world in which the event has arisen, but
cannot, by nature o f its evental status, ever be anything other than universal in nature
unless used with reactionary or obscurantist connotations.

Zizek slips between those who insist on a purely historical view of the
resurrection, and those who see it as purely metaphorical or mythological in the pejorative
sense. For Zizek, the resurrection is neither pure history, in the sense o f an actually
occurring material event (a dead man getting up and walking around, later ascending to
the sky), nor is it a metaphor for something else, like an existential experience (in which a
person receives “new life” through faith in the risen Christ). It is rather, both an historical
occurrence (in the life o f the collective) and a truth (precisely because it is organically
related to the Spirit o f the emancipatory/ egalitarian collective as such). In the Christian
religion, and above all in its celebration o f the death and resurrection o f Jesus, in short,
there is first an evacuation of the heavens so that there are no longer any gods overseeing
and affirming our actions, and there is secondly a movement or transference of the
oversight and power o f affirmation from the heavens to the collective. To speak o f the
death and resurrection o f Jesus is in Zizek, then, to speak o f something real - even if the
referent is only obliquely referenced in its original religious representation, which
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therefore requires a certain hermeneutical skill to grasp directly. The “aeternae veritates”
o f Christian theology, therefore, remain truths, though they are ultimately translated in
Zizek’s thought into the death o f God and the actualization o f Spirit in community.
This, however, is also in perfect agreement with something basic to Badiou’s
reading o f dialectical materialism:
The universality o f truths rests on subjective form s that cannot be either individual
or communitarian.
Or:
To the extent that it is the subject o f a truth, a subject subtracts itself from every
community and destroys every individuation.189
One needs to recall here Badiou’s notion o f fidelity to an event. It is this fidelity that
precisely constitutes a subject (the worker, the Christian, etc.) It further leads us to ask the
question: What today constitutes a Christian subject? In light o f Badiou’s work, it must
be recognized that for Badiou terms like “worker” or “Christian” are in the end merely
identitarian predicates o f a subject. The subject proper is one who is faithful to a truth, a
truth that is indifferent to all particular designations. The terms in question are ultimately
irrelevant, and it is for this reason that Badiou can appropriate St. Paul (known formally
as a Christian) as an example o f a subject who is faithful. The Christ-event for Badiou,
remember, did not have particular significance, but universal, and as such cuts across all
historical identities and particular worlds. It would be a mistake, therefore, to think in
terms o f a “Christian subject” that is somehow qualitatively different than any other
Badiouan subject. There are only two exceptions to this rule which we have seen above:
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the reactionary subject, and the obscure subject. The Christian subject would be a
reactionary/obscure subject only insofar as this subject denies evental status to an event in
a non-religious (Christian) world. The predicate “Christian” here merely goes along for
the ride, designating, perhaps, the content o f a subject’s reactionist or obscurantist
behaviour.

3.4 Communitas
This, I would suggest, touches directly upon an important area concerning which the
Church has traditionally been mistaken. For sheer membership o f the Church has too
often been viewed as the goal: participation in its life through attendance at worship and
sharing in the sacraments, in a word, has tended to be identified as the life o f faith. The
reality, however, is that inclusion in this institution, this particular community, is no
V

guarantee o f one’s subjective status in Badiou’s and Zizek’s sense, and is incapable of
constituting human subjectivity.190 Rather, it is by virtue o f one’s fidelity to a truth, a
fidelity setting one apart from one’s particular world, and even perhaps at times a fidelity
that is indifferent to identitarian designations, that both true human subjects and a true
human community - one that stands in the truth - are constituted. This is precisely why
St. Paul can say:

190 For more about what Badiou means by “subject” see the brief quote from Badiou and
following comments on pages 14-15, as well as the comments on page 36 concerning
“disinterested-interest.” For Badiou, a human subject is constituted when, rising above
simple self-interest, a person sacrifices herself for the interests o f others, or for a greater
Idea which may conflict even with self-preservation, see Badiou, Ethics, 49.
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If someone else thinks they have reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have
more: circumcised on the eighth day, o f the people o f Israel, o f the tribe of
Benjamin, a Hebrew o f Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee;
But whatever were gains to me I now consider loss for the sake o f Christ. What is
more, I consider everything a loss because o f the surpassing worth o f knowing
Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them
garbage that I may gain Christ.191192

Or in another place:
What, after all, is Apollos? And what is Paul? Only servants, through whom you
came to believe— as the Lord has assigned to each his task. I planted the seed,
Apollos watered it, but God has been making it grow. So neither the one who
plants nor the one who waters is anything, but only God, who makes things grow.
So then, no more boasting about human leaders! All things are yours, whether
Paul or Apollos or Cephas
or the world or life or death or the present or the
YQ'J
future— all are yours.

In the same way we should recognize the error in assigning any significance to one’s
particular ecclesial belonging or leadership, as if these things were somehow a guarantee
o f meaning. For Paul, all identitarian predicates (to use Badiou’s term) were considered
refuse, and all particular guarantees were as nothing. Taking this logic to its end, we
might go so far as to rephrase St. Paul’s words as follows:

What, after all, is the Church? And what is Communism? Only servants through
whom you came to believe - as the Idea has assigned to each a task. One planted
the seed, the other watered it, but the Spirit has been making it grow. So neither
the one who plants nor the one who waters is anything, but only the Spirit, who
makes things grow. So then no more boasting about human leaders or particular
institutions! All things are yours, whether the Party or the Church, or the world or
life or death or the present or the future - all are yours by virtue o f the death o f
God and the Spirit o f the collective.
191 Philippians 3:4b-5, 7-8.
192

1 Corinthians 3:5-7,21.
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Zizek makes a similar point concerning contemporary social movements,
emphasising their failure properly to address the issue o f universality:
Today’s blockade is that there are two ways open for the socio-political
engagement: either play the game o f the system, engage in the “long march
through the institutions,” or get active in new social movements, from feminism
through ecology to anti-racism. And, again, the limit o f these movements is that
they are not political in the sense o f the Universal Singular: they are “one issue
movements” which lack the dimension o f the universality, i.e. they do not relate to
the social totality.193

One does not have to look far to see the same error in the Church today. For has the
contemporary Church not taken exactly these two routes, either the institutional one, or
the turn to new social expressions o f the gospel in various theologies and communities,
both o f which have the defect o f ignoring what Zizek calls the “Universal Singular”
understanding o f the Church in its universalizing address?
At this point, however, Zizek can also be critiqued by Badiou. We have already
seen the importance o f experimentation within the field o f fidelity. Is the institutional
Church, along with its varied social movement expressions, not itself a series o f different
kinds o f experimentation in their own right, a working out o f the gospel in diverse forms?
V

Where Zizek’s critique remains pertinent is precisely at the points where these forms fail
to recognize themselves as addressing the totality o f the community, or do not recognize
the “Thy Kingdom come” aspect o f faith as a radical promise and command
encapsulating all aspects o f life, including the political. But for this to happen requires

1 v
Zizek, “Lenins Full Subjective Engagement,” The Symptom, available at
http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=T 012.
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that there be genuine criticism, experimentation, spontaneity, and fidelity in a variety of
particular circumstances.
The challenge, then, for a pointal ecclesiology is to maintain both that an ecclesial
community is made up spontaneously o f those who are faithful subjects of the truth event,
while at the same time maintaining a proper dimension o f universality insofar as the
Church is a political community. It is not that an aggregate o f self-interested individuals
somehow equals the collective, but that the subject’s activity, which is by nature
primarily concerned with communitas, reveals her as a member o f the collective. Her
Spirit-activity is oriented precisely to generating, sustaining, and living communitas.
One is reminded here o f Jesus’ reinstatement o f Peter, when Jesus asked Peter
three questions regarding whether Peter loved Jesus or not, which were then quickly
followed by the statement “feed my sheep/lambs (John 21:16-18).” Here, love worked
out responsibly in concrete community is inseparable from the call to discipleship, to
“come follow me.” It is perhaps no accident that when Peter was about to follow Jesus
and asked about one o f his comrades who lingered behind, Jesus responded with the
question, “What is that to you?” This is somewhat reminiscent of his response in the
incident with the man who wanted to bury his dead relative but was quickly told by Jesus
that the “dead can bury their own dead.” It is as if he were saying, “Do not forget your
task. Your subjectivity does not consist in worrying about another’s status, but in your
fidelity to the mission.”
Here, then, is the proper way to understand communitas, for it is not (as is often
superficially thought in the Churches o f the West) merely an intimate community in
which we get to find out each other’s deepest feelings and personal life stories,
eliminating perceived distances between each another, and “including” each other.
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Communitas must include Jesus’ crucial, “What is that to you?” element. Zizek has
spoken o f this in terms o f the need for less understanding and more discretion in the
context o f a comment on globalization, which it would be worth quoting in full:
This is what those who see globalization as the chance for the entire earth as a
unified space o f communication, bringing together all humanity, fail to notice:
since a Neighbor is (as Freud suspected long ago) primarily a Thing, a traumatic
intruder, someone whose different way o f life (or, rather, way of jouissance
materialized in its social practices and rituals) disturb us, throw off the rails the
balance o f our way o f life, when the Neighbor comes too close, this can also give
rise to aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid o f this disturbing intruder - or, as
Peter Sloterdijk put it: “More communication means at first above all more
conflict.” This is why the attitude o f “understanding-each-other” has to be
supplemented by the attitude of “getting-out-of-each-other’s-way,” by maintaining
an appropriate distance, by a new “code o f discretion.” European civilization finds
it easier to tolerate different ways o f life precisely on account of what its critics
usually denounce as its weakness and failure, namely the “alienation” o f social
life.” Alienation means (also) that distance is included into the very social texture:
even if I live side by side with others, the normal state is to ignore them. I am
allowed not to get too close to others; I move in a social space where I interact
with others obeying certain external “mechanical” rules, without sharing their
“inner world” - and, perhaps, the lesson to be learned is that, sometimes, a dose of
alienation is indispensable for the peaceful coexistence o f ways o f life.
Sometimes, alienation is not a problem but a solution: globalization will turn
explosive not if we remain isolated from each other, but, on the opposite, if we get
too close to each other.194

Unfortunately, what Zizek here critiques is something that many Churches and
communist totalitarianisms alike often appear to have in common: a drive to know all
private thoughts, a refusal to grant any private “inner” space, making every personal
idiosyncrasy or desire part o f the commons - and then, in principle, something subject to
being collectively punished in some way. The Christian subject’s proper response to the
injunction to confess or share some inner part o f the self might well be, by contrast, to
pose the more pointed question, “What is that to you?” The greater truth here recognized

194 Zizek, “Antimonies o f Tolerant Reason” in lacan.com available at
http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm
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is that it is not our little interior sins and foibles that matter, but the wider task o f the
Church, i.e. the task set before the emancipatory collective. Are we faithful to it?
Is it possible to avoid or evade at this point the tension between the notion o f a
kind o f outward objective truth and a more inward subjective one? In other words, is the
striving for “understanding-each-other” not a reflection o f the recognition of the truth of
subjective inner experience, versus another understanding o f truth not located primarily in
subjective experience, but in action and in an Idea? I wonder how much the former is a
reflection o f a kind o f Schleiermacherian influence on religious subjectivity, and indeed
o f post-modem culture, forced no doubt by the Enlightenment and modernity, and as such
more o f a symptom o f our ecclesiological problem than its cure. When the conception of
an objective yet personal God was being severely called into question by science and
modem reason, the move inward was (arguably) a logical one. In one sense, the move
made had already been anticipated long before. As Wilhelm Dilthey has suggested, the
inward move has been present in Christianity from the beginning, and stands against what
he saw as the objectification o f truth by the ancient Greeks:

For the Greek mind, knowing was mirroring an objective thing in the intelligence.
Now [i.e., in Christianity], experience becomes the focal point o f all the interests
o f the new communities; but this is just simple awareness o f what is given in
personality and in consciousness o f the self.... With the enormous interest they
generate, experiences o f the will and o f the heart swallow up every other object of
knowledge.... If this community faith had immediately developed a science
perfectly appropriate to it, that science would have to rest on die foundation
ultimately resting on inner experience.195

195 From Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences. An Attempt to Lay the
Foundation fo r the Study o f Society and History, trans. Ramon J. Betanzos (Detroit:
Wayne State University Press), 229. Quoted in Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 106-107.
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The later institutionalization o f the Church occurred, on such terms, as a sort o f lapse
from the original ideal, and became necessary for the sake o f administering a fallen
Roman Empire and preventing ensuing anarchy. Such factors, it might be thought, led to
the suppression o f the original Christian impulse in making the move inwards, as “the
remnants o f the ancient social institutions, and the culture they expressed rested on the
shoulders o f the Church.”196197
The convictions represented here by Dilthey’s views are themselves, however, in
large measure a product o f modernity and o f the tradition o f Schleiermacher as it found
root and flourished in Protestant Liberalism. But what if one were to read the situation
from a very different, Zizekian perspective? What if the much-maligned outward rigidity
o f the Church as it emerged in the late Empire and through the medieval period was
instead to be seen as an inevitable implication o f the political impulse that lies at the core
o f its faith? The implication would then not be that the early Church in its institutionalpolitical development, had betrayed its true inward character, exchanging rich inward
experience for cold institutional control, but rather that the institutional Church was the
direct expression o f true Christian self-understanding. For here the Church made
precisely the move from “social movement” to “Universal Singular,” seizing the
opportunity given in the moment to relate to the social totality. For this reason the
Church could never make the “Cincinnatus” move, eschewing the Empire and its public
responsibilities after the Empire fell.

Its program was rightly total and all-

196 Vattimo, 108.
197 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus was called on by the Roman Senate to serve as dictator
in the face o f attack upon Rome. He was, by Livy’s account, a farmer, found by the
ambassadors to be “digging a ditch” on his three-acre farm. After donning a toga and the
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encompassing. It could only really be forced out o f the picture, in fact, by other political
players, and indeed this is what happened. It slowly lost its influence, until finally
succumbing at the political level at the very moment that its objective foundations were
so massively undermined: i.e., in the Enlightenment and in the death of the objective God
- and indeed, in the very response seen in the Schleiermacherian move towards inward
authenticating religious experience as opposed to a public role in the life o f the polis.

10S

It should be obvious by now that within a Zizekian paradigm, the opposites of
“outward” and “inward” are overcome through a notion o f Spirit that can only be
understood in terms o f the collective’s political engagement. Like the Epistle o f James, a
Church characterized by a pointal theology will say: “Show me your faith without deeds,
and I will show you my faith by my deeds” (James 2:18). At each point the Church
manifests and in a certain sense realizes its fidelity in the public decisions it makes. This
fidelity in action does not downplay inner experience; it rather actualizes it. This198
office o f dictator, repelling the attack on Rome, he returned to his farm some sixteen days
later, even though he had been invested with his dictatorship for six months. Livy, The
Early History o f Rome (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 226. Livy, Ab Urbe Condita,
3.26ff.
198 Theology is not the only casualty o f modernity it seems. In Stephen Hawking and
Leonard Mlodinow’s latest project The Grand Design, they also take aim at philosophy:
“Where did we all come from? Did the universe need a creator? [...] Traditionally these
are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with
modem developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the
bearers o f the torch o f discovery in our quest for knowledge.” Stephen Hawking and
Leonard Mlodinov, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), 5. It must be
said that this seems rather naive and hubristic. It reveals the rather simplistic view these
writers have o f philosophy. One wonders what fellow scientists who work in the field of
the philosophy o f science must think o f statements like this, who no doubt, would
immediately recognize the blatant ideological assumptions involved in taking such a
position. It is no wonder that philosophy too has been tempted to take the “inward turn”
with the manifestation o f various New Age philosophies concerned with holism and
meditation.
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approach would be strictly opposed to any kind o f merely individual religious sensibility
or “sensuousness,” but with Marx, it would instead recognise religious experience as
inherently bound up with questions of social relations.199 Rather than apologize for
“secularizing” this experience, a pointal theology following Badiou and Zizek would
embrace this view, recognizing in the faithful collective its new expression, one which
(also following Marx) recognizes the need to combine “interpretation” with action. For
the point is indeed not (only) to interpret the world, but to change it.
Here too mention might be made again o f an earlier claim made in this thesis, to
the effect that Zizek is understandable as an optimistic type of Badiouan actor. Why,
after all, does Badiou advocate a subtractive form o f politics, whereas Zizek advocates
integration with existing structures? I suggested earlier that this has to do with Badiou’s
ontology and understanding o f the event. What if, however, the two positions should be
seen in light o f their respective treatment o f the resurrection? Badiou’s subtractive politics
might then be seen in light o f his notion that the resurrection is pure ‘Tabulation,” whereas
V

Zizek’s participatory politics stems from his notion o f integrative Spirit. In the latter, it is
resurrection theology that drives emancipatory praxis. Or, to put the point another way,
within the ambit o f a pointal ecclesiology, engagement in politics can be seen as a
reflection o f Spirit’s totalizing claim on the social field. But though (as at so many points
in the reading of Badiou and Zizek) the theological point is pregnant with implication,
there is insufficient scope to develop the claim more fully in this thesis.

199 Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,

1994), 98.
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By Way of Conclusion
It was John Milbank who said o f ¿izek: “In an important sense, he bears a
theological witness.”200 I would like to amend Milbank’s judgment slightly to say that
Badiou and Zizek together bear what is potentially an important theological witness. This
is not to say that the Church should or could adopt their positions without remainder, but
it is clear to me that the Church should and could do worse than to learn from them. Such
an approach is entirely consistent with Charles Taylor’s claim that today the Church
“might better listen for a voice which we could never have assumed ourselves, whose
tone m ight have been forever unknown to us if we hadn’t strained to understand it.”20120
Even if, in the end, we disagree with Zizek’s appropriation o f the Christian story, and
with his alternative interpretation o f “Spirit,” or take exception to Zizek’s and Badiou’s
politicizing o f what they perceive to be the core o f Christian theology,

we nevertheless

have to admit that they do something many Christians have singularly failed to do which is, to take Christianity seriously. But surely this is the primary function o f a
Christian theology.
If, on the other hand, the Christian thinker is able truly to draw on Badiou and
Zizek to answer the question: “What does it mean to be a faithful subject?” then he or she
too will be able to echo the closing words o f Badiou’s second manifesto for philosophy:

200 Zizek and Milbank, 111.
201 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 754.
202 But as Daniel M. Bell Jr. has poignantly said: “Theology is always-already political.”
Daniel M. Bell Jr., “State and Civil Society” in The Blackwell Companion to Political
Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 434.
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[I]f we are armed with this conviction, if we understand that to participate, point
by point, in the process o f creation o f subjectivizable bodies is what renders life
more powerful than survival, we will possess what Rimbaud, at the end o f A
Season in Hell, desired above all else: ‘Truth, in a soul and a body.’ Then shall
we be stronger than Time.203

203

Alain Badiou, Second Manifesto fo r Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 130.
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